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Seeking a Definition of Medical Futility with
Reference to the Louisiana Natural Death Act†
Frederick R. Parker, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
The general question concerning the existence of a patient’s right in
the United States either to accept or refuse care at the end of life has largely
been resolved through a fairly consistent body of jurisprudence, statutory
schemes, and pronouncements of professional ethics.1 The principal
statutory expression of this right in Louisiana is found in the Natural Death
Act (the “Act”), in which the legislature recognized the right of patients
under certain conditions either to withhold treatment at the outset of care
or to withdraw treatment that had already been initiated.2 However, the
legislature left open the ultimate scope of this right, which remains the
Copyright 2017, by FREDERICK R. PARKER, JR.
† Part of the discussion in this Article is derived from the author’s prior
analysis in Law, Bioethics, and Medical Futility: Defining Patient Rights at the
End of Life, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 185 (2015). That work addressed
the issue of medical futility in the specific context of the Uniform Health Care
Decisions Act (“UHCDA”) and the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
(“URTIA”) with respect to both the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and the
active administration of extreme palliative interventions. Id. This Article
addresses only the first of those issues, with a specific focus on the Louisiana
Natural Death Act. A portion of the broader analysis in Law, Bioethics, and
Medical Futility: Defining Patient Rights at the End of Life that is equally relevant
to this discussion in the narrow context of the Louisiana Act is presented here with
the permission of the UALR Law Review.
 J.D., Louisiana State University (Member, Louisiana Law Review, Class
of 1987); LL.M. in Health Law, University of Houston; LL.M. in Taxation, New
York University; Professor, Louisiana State University in Shreveport; Of
Counsel, Onebane Law Firm, Lafayette and Shreveport, Louisiana.
1. See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE
2-3–2-41, 7-7–7-50 (3d ed. 2004). These issues initially arose when surrogates for
permanently unconscious patients who did not satisfy the legal criteria for whole
“brain death” began to refuse treatment that offered no reasonable hope of either
restoring the patient’s capacity or reversing the dying process. See id. at 2-3.
Perhaps the most widely cited United States Supreme Court case in this regard is
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See also TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 170–81
(4th ed. 1994) (describing and integrating surrogate judgment making standards
arising out of jurisprudence).
2. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151 (2016).
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subject of debate both in the courts and among physicians, bioethicists,
and moral philosophers. One of the most significant and problematic of
these unresolved questions involves the relationship between the Act and
the elusive concept of “medical futility.”
Although the Act unambiguously reflects the traditional view of the
patient’s right of self-determination as a negative one, the contemporary
variant of the question asks whether a patient’s right to refuse
recommended treatment necessarily encompasses the right to receive
interventions that have not been offered, and, if so, what constraints might
limit the scope of that positive right. Framed from the opposite
perspective, the question would ask whether, and to what extent, the Act
would recognize a physician’s authority to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment that a patient has expressly requested—whether
directly or through a surrogate.3
Although other states have enacted similar statutory schemes as a
means of ensuring the patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment,4
some commentators have argued that the statutes also were intended to
recognize a physician’s authority to unilaterally withhold or withdraw lifesustaining procedures on the grounds of medical futility.5 This issue is
perhaps most problematic when a surrogate for a permanently unconscious
or otherwise irreversibly incapacitated patient seeks treatment that would
be beneficial in the sense of postponing the moment of death, but which

3. Cf. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-24–13-27.
4. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170–81. See, e.g., UNIF.
RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989); UNIF. HEALTHCARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993). According to Meisel, “several”
states have adopted the URTIA in either its 1985 or 1989 version. See MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-54–7-58. According to the Uniform Law
Commission’s Legislative Fact Sheet, the UHCDA had been adopted by Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wyoming as of 2014,
although the advance directive statutes of some states appear to be modified forms
of the UHCDA. Legislative Fact Sheet–Health-Care Decisions Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspxtitle=HealthCare%20Decisions%20Act [https://perma.cc/RT3X-YG4X] (last visited Jan. 10,
2016). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-55, 7-79–7-89
(summarizing the law in this regard in other jurisdictions). Notwithstanding the
narrow scope of this right as expressed in statutory schemes, however, the various
advance directive statutes are cumulative with existing law. According to Meisel,
“they are intended to preserve and supplement existing common law and
constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit them.” See id. at 7-33–7-35.
5. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor
to Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007).
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the attending physician has denied because it offers no reasonable hope as
a curative measure.
This Article addresses the specific issue of how the Louisiana Act
might inform the question of whether, or in what circumstances, treatment
can be so futile that a patient has no positive right to receive it. As this
issue most commonly arises in the context of permanently incapacitated
patients whose surrogates speak on their behalf, it would be appropriate to
first consider the relevance of a patient’s decisional capacity to the
question. As a preliminary matter, this Article begins by discussing the
concept of personhood and the relevance of capacity to the right of a
severely incapacitated patient to accept or refuse treatment.
I. PERSONHOOD, DECISIONAL CAPACITY, AND THE
PROBLEMATIC CONCEPT OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
The courts, practicing physicians, and bioethicists have long struggled
in their efforts to define medical futility in a meaningful way, yet they
remain confounded in the search for a universal meaning of the term that
fairly accommodates the convergence of law, medicine, and bioethics.6
The elusive nature of a workable definition stems from the problematic
relationship between the ambiguity inherent in the concept of futility, the
subtle uncertainties that inevitably attend the exercise of clinical judgment,
and the fluid boundaries that define the parameters of professional
discretion.7
6. In general, it has been said that futility is not “a discrete and definable
entity . . . [but] merely the end of the spectrum of therapies with very low
efficacy.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-14 (quoting John D. Lantos
et al., The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice, 87 AM. J. MED. 81, 81 (1989)).
In the narrow sense, treatment would be considered “futile” if it lacks efficacy in
terms of accomplishing the specific physiological objective for which it is sought.
Id. at 13-15. Physicians are generally regarded as having the professional
prerogative to unilaterally withhold or withdraw such objectively futile clinical
interventions, and to do so without the patient’s consent. Id. In a broader sense,
futility has been described as the “inability to prolong life for a time,” or the
“inability to maintain an acceptable quality of life.” Id. at 13-13 (quoting Stuart J.
Younger, Who Defines Futility?, 260 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2094, 2095 (1988)). The
American Medical Association considers decisions about interventions that are
not futile in an objective physiologic sense to be sufficiently value laden as to
make them a matter of the patient’s prerogative. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 18–19 (2014).
7. This lack of consensus presumably becomes increasingly problematic as
our population ages and as financial considerations increasingly constrain the
provision of health care, making the issue likely to be both more common and
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At its most fundamental level, the concept of “medical futility” relates
to the ultimate scope of a physician’s obligation as a matter of law and
bioethics to avail patients of specific clinical interventions.8 In the most
narrow, purely objective sense, a treatment regimen would be considered
“futile” only if it lacks efficacy in terms of being able to accomplish the
specific physiological objective for which it is employed.9 Thus, an
intervention that has been scientifically proven to have no physiological
effect on a patient’s condition would not fall within the standard of care,
and a physician’s decision not to provide it on the basis of physiological
futility would stir no controversy.10 At the opposite end of the spectrum,
and viewed more broadly as a subjective concept, medical futility has been
described as reflecting the “inability to prolong life for a time,” or the
“inability to maintain an acceptable quality of life.”11
As a practical matter, questions about futility tend to arise in
circumstances that fall between the two extremes of purely objective and
purely subjective measures, where decisions about the appropriate clinical
response to a patient’s condition are grounded primarily in objective,
more significant over time. According to Professor Meisel, the futility debate
might be difficult to resolve because it “revolves around fundamentally
irresolvable moral conflicts concerning our most deeply held beliefs about the
value of life.” MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-13 (quoting E. Haavi
Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, 24 HASTINGS
CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 33, 33.) It also has been suggested that the debate
about medical futility will arise with increasing frequency as the scope of advance
directives expands beyond their traditional purpose of expressing the patient’s
wishes concerning the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to
directing the administration of treatment that physicians might consider to be
futile. Id. at 7-9–7-10, 13-43–13-44. See also Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4.
8. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-14.
9. Id. at 13-14–13-15.
10. In its traditional expression, the concept of medical futility most
commonly relates to a physician’s determination that a treatment regimen offers
no meaningful benefit to the patient in a physiological sense. Physicians generally
are regarded as having the professional prerogative to unilaterally withhold or
withdraw such objectively futile clinical interventions, and to do so without the
patient’s consent. Id. at 13-14. See also ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER, &
WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL
DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 20 (McGraw Hill Educ., 8th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter CLINICAL ETHICS]. Moreover, all interventions would be considered
physiologically futile if there is “an utter impossibility” that any of the
interventions could produce the desired physiological response to the patient’s
condition. Id. at 27.
11. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-13 (quoting Stuart J. Younger,
Who Defines Futility?, 260 AM. J. MED. ASS’N 2094, 2095 (1988)).
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scientific criteria, though inevitably tempered by the physician’s subjective
judgment concerning the overall efficacy of the proposed intervention.12
This apparent dichotomy reflects the full range of factors that bear upon the
exercise of clinical judgment, although it inevitably blurs the line between
interventions that are medically indicated and those that would be futile to
provide under the circumstances.13
12. CLINICAL ETHICS, supra note 10, at 21. Interventions in these cases are
sometimes referred to as “not medically indicated.” Id. at 34. In general,
interventions are “medically indicated” when “the patient’s impaired physical or
mental condition may be improved by their application.” Id. at 21. The
contemporary version of the futility debate delves into the scope of the term
“medically indicated” by asking under what circumstances a physician may
override a patient’s request for treatment—whether expressed directly or through
a surrogate—that is non-curative, but nevertheless offers an identifiable, though
temporary, physiological benefit. See generally id. at 30. In general, the
underlying principle that governs the physician’s ethical and professional
responsibilities “are closely tied to their ability to fulfill the goals of medicine in
conjunction with their respect for patients’ preferences about the goals of their
lives.” Id. at 14. The various facets of this question can be analyzed in relation
either to the goals of treatment—to cure the patient’s condition, to mitigate the
suffering that might be associated with it, or to provide comfort care—or to the
status of the patient as “dying,” “terminal,” or “incurable.” See generally id. at
20–26. Any question concerning a physician’s judgment about the clinical
viability of an intervention would implicate the law of medical malpractice when
a patient contends that a physician mistakenly concluded that it would have been
physiologically futile to employ a treatment regimen that, in fact, was a viable
clinical option. As a matter of law, such presentations of the futility question are
relatively straightforward in the sense that their resolution turns upon reconciling
the physician’s conduct with the professional standard of care, which would be
established with reference to expert testimony. This Article does not focus on
mistakes in determining whether an intervention is futile in an objectively clinical
sense, but instead on how the law should define futility in the abstract. See, e.g.,
id. at 44.
13. As noted by Professors Jonsen, Siegler, and Winslade,
Given the nature of medical science and the particularities of each
patient, clinical judgment is never absolutely certain. Clinical medicine
was described by Dr. William Osler as “a science of uncertainty and an
art of probability.” The central task of clinicians is to reduce uncertainty
to the extent possible by using clinical data, medical science, and
reasoning to reach a diagnosis and propose a plan of care. The process
by which a clinician attempts to make consistently good decisions in the
face of uncertainty is called clinical judgment.
Id. at 26. In light of this “uncertain science” and the “art of probability” that shape
the exercise of clinical judgment, it has been suggested that physicians tend to reach
widely divergent conclusions about the effectiveness of clinical interventions. Id. at
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The appropriate placement of that line becomes most uncertain when
a physician’s clinical judgment incorporates a purely subjective
assessment concerning patient characteristics that are unrelated to the
physiological efficacy of an intervention. Such cases, which reflect the
contemporary focus of the futility question, go beyond the purely objective
measure of absolute physiological futility to ask under what circumstances
a physician may override a patient’s request for treatment that is noncurative but nevertheless offers an identifiable, though merely temporary,
physiological benefit.14 For example, physicians occasionally withdraw
nutrition and hydration from permanently unconscious patients after
concluding that the continuation of treatment would merely and
indefinitely prolong the patient’s physical existence, but would do so
without offering any hope for his return to a sapient state.15 In some of

28. These diverse results also have been attributed to the varied levels of clinical
experience among physicians and the relative scarcity of studies that demonstrate
meaningful probabilities. Id. Altogether, the resulting vagueness has led some
clinicians and ethicists to deny futility as a meaningful concept, although others
consider it useful with respect to interventions that have a low likelihood of
success. Id. In any event, the contemporary debate about clinical futility focuses
on the level of statistical evidence that would support a determination of futility,
whether the patient or the physician should decide that an intervention is futile,
and what process should be employed to resolve disagreements between patients
and their physicians concerning those determinations. Id.
14. Pope, supra note 5, at 3–4.
15. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). These
cases might include patients who are in a persistent vegetative state, a state of
permanent unconsciousness, or another such state of severe incapacity that is
believed to be irreversible. Patients in a persistent vegetative state generally
maintain sufficient brain stem function to enable them to “breathe air, digest food,
and produce urine without assistance.” MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI &
DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 530 (7th ed. 2007). These
patients tend to experience cycles of sleep in which their eyes are closed, and
cycles of awakening in which their eyes are open. Id. They might smile, utter
unintelligible sounds, move their eyes and limbs, though sporadically, and exhibit
reflexive responses to physical stimuli by grimacing, coughing, or gagging, all of
which give the appearance of consciousness when there is none. Id. In contrast,
persons in a coma are in a sleep-like state and exhibit no indications of
consciousness. See, e.g., id. at 530–31. Many of such patients would be considered
terminally ill under the customary natural death act, even if their biological life
could be sustained indefinitely by application of artificial nutrition and hydration,
and by mechanical ventilation.

2017]

SEEKING A DEFINITION OF MEDICAL FUTILITY

761

these cases, physicians have withheld treatment unilaterally, openly
disregarding an authorized surrogate’s order to the contrary.16
Some physicians would justify such unilateral decisions to withhold
treatment as the legitimate exercise of medical judgment, and at least one
court has addressed the issue from that perspective.17 However, it would be
incoherent to resolve these cases with reference to professional judgment
unless the physician would also have withheld treatment from otherwise
similarly situated patients who had a reasonable prospect of regaining
consciousness.18 Under this view, a custom of unilaterally withholding
treatment from only permanently unconscious patients would not reflect the
exercise of professional discretion concerning the efficacy of a procedure that
a physician reasonably expects to prolong life. Rather, such a custom would
appear to reflect only the physician’s value judgment concerning the right of
a severely incapacitated patient to receive treatment.19
This perspective compels consideration of whether there is something
different about a patient with a severe cognitive impairment that would qualify
his right to have a surrogate speak on his behalf after losing capacity. Much
of the tension in the present debate about medical futility arises more out of a
conflict of visions concerning that fundamental issue than the respect to be
accorded the physician’s exercise of medical judgment.20
Many of the participants in this debate would resolve the futility question
by relying on the traditional legal and ethical principles that have come to
define the scope and durability of one’s general right to accept or refuse
medical treatment at the end of life.21 However, one might question the
relevance of those principles in the context of a patient who has no reasonable
prospect of returning to a sapient existence, particularly when a continuation
of treatment would lead to an extended physical life that may span years rather
than mere hours or days. With respect to patients in a persistent vegetative
state, for example, Peter Singer has said:

16. See, e.g., Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1075–76 (La.
Ct. App. 1998).
17. Id. at 1076.
18. See, e.g., id. at 1075–76.
19. Id.
20. According to Professor Meisel, the futility debate might be difficult to
resolve because it “revolves around fundamentally irresolvable moral conflicts
concerning our most deeply held beliefs about the value of life.” M EISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 13-13 (quoting E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly
Diminished Life: The Casualties of Coercion, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 33).
21. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170.
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They are not self-conscious, rational, or autonomous, and so
considerations of a right to life or of respecting autonomy do not
apply. If they have no experiences at all, and can never have any
again, their lives have no intrinsic value. Their life’s journey has
come to an end. They are biologically alive, but not biographically.22
Adherents to this view would disregard the relevance of principles concerning
one’s fundamental right to self-determination simply by denying that it should
be ascribed to permanently unconscious patients.23
In opposition, there is the idea that any human being is the subject of
rights and intrinsic value by virtue of what he is by nature, rather than with
reference to any actual capacities he might possess at any point in time during
life.24 Those who advocate this view would find it both illogical and unjust to
define one’s rights with reference to his state of consciousness:
To base the intrinsic value of a being on an accidental attribute—
such as consciousness or the immediately exercisable capacity for
consciousness—is to base a radical moral difference on a mere
quantitative ontological difference. We treat beings who are
subjects of rights radically differently from the way we treat other
beings. The basis for that radical difference in treatment must be
some radical difference in the different types of beings treated
differently. Between any human being and a corpse or an
aggregate of tissues and organs there is a radical difference. But
the difference between a healthy, self-conscious human being and
22. PATRICK LEE & ROBERT P. GEORGE, BODY-SELF DUALISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS AND POLITICS 152 (2008) (quoting PETER SINGER,
PRACTICAL ETHICS (3rd. ed. 1993)). Although Singer acknowledges that these
persons are “biologically alive,” he nevertheless suggests that, for all practical
purposes, they are not. Id. From a legal perspective, however, Singer’s argument
is negated by the definition of death. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 9:111(A) (2016),
which defines a person’s “death” in these terms:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a
physician, duly licensed in the state of Louisiana based on ordinary
standards of approved medical practice, the person has experienced an
irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions.
In the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that
these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the
announced opinion of a physician, duly licensed in the state of Louisiana
based upon ordinary standards of approved medical practice, the person
has experienced an irreversible total cessation of brain function.
23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
24. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 154–55.
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a human being incapacitated, even severely incapacitated, is only a
difference in degree. It is unjust, then, to pick out such an accidental
attribute as self-consciousness or the immediately exercisable
capacity for self-consciousness and make that the criterion for
whether someone should be treated as a subject of rights or not.
Thus, a human being is valuable as a subject of rights in virtue of
what he or she is (a person, a subject with the basic nature capacity
for conceptual thought and free choice even if he or she cannot right
now actualize that basic capacity). And so a human being remains
a subject of rights, someone who has a right not to be intentionally
killed, for as long as he or she exists.25
The central premise of this Article is that established principles of both
law and bioethics that relate to the right of a patient either to accept or
refuse medical treatment implicitly reflect and rest upon this perspective.26
Accordingly, the arguments presented here are grounded in the following

25. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 155. The implications of this “singular”
view of the human person are profound. Those who see personhood from this
perspective would have it that the human body is not a mere external tool to be
used, consumed, or subjected to experimentation for the benefit of others without
consent. Id. at 82. Rather, they would argue that the human organism, in and of
itself, has a full moral worth and, as such, is the subject of rights. Id. This view
would be consistent with that of John Locke, who argued that our lives are
inalienable because we hold them in trust for God, who truly owns both our lives
and our liberties. According to Locke,
[A] man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or
his own consent . . . put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of
another, to take away his life, when he pleases. [H]e that cannot take
away his own life, cannot give another power over it. . . . [T]he
fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human
sanction can be good, or valid against it.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 284, 358 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). The state’s interest in preserving life
reflects this premise, by implication if not by design. At the same time,
however, the principle of autonomy reflects the law’s recognition that liberty
necessarily entails one’s freedom to make choices that are unique to his or
her perspective about how to honor that trust.
26. Advance directive statutes, by definition, rest on this premise. See
generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170–81 (discussing
surrogate decision-making, which rests on the fundamental rule of law that the
right either to give or refuse consent to treatment survives incapacity, thus leaving
for resolution only one’s preference under the circumstances).
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specific assumptions.27 First, because biological life is essential and
intrinsic to human personhood, a person comes into being not later than
the time of his birth, by which time the human organism itself has been
identified as a discrete biological entity that is “a whole . . . member of the
species homo sapiens.”28 Second, a person ceases to exist only when the
27. These premises also serve as the foundation for the arguments raised by
the author in a broader work concerning medical futility. See Frederick R. Parker,
Jr., Law, Bioethics, and Medical Futility: Defining Patient Rights at the End of
Life, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 185, 190–91 (2015).
28. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 122. Professors Lee and George ground
this reasoning in the science of embryology, from which they conclude “the life
of an individual human being begins with the joining of sperm and ovum, which
yields a genetically and functionally distinct organism, possessing the resources
and active disposition for internally directed development toward human
maturity.” Id. at 118–19 (citing WILLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY (3rd
ed. 2001); KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN:
CLINICALLY ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY (7th ed. 2003); RONAN R. O’RAHILLY &
FABIOLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND TERATOLOGY (3rd ed. 2001);
SCOTT F. GILBERT, DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY (7th ed. 2003)). More specifically,
they announce “three important points.” Id. at 120. First, they announce that the
embryo, from its inception, is distinct from any cell of either the father or the
mother, as reflected in the fact that “[i]ts growth is internally directed to its own
survival and maturation, a distinct end from the survival and flourishing of the
mother in whose body this distinct organism resides.” Id. Second, they announce
that the embryo possesses the genetic composition of a human being. Id. Third,
they announce that the embryo “is a whole, though obviously immature, human
being.” Id. Professors Lee and George distinguished the embryo as a separately
identifiable organism from the gametes whose union brought it into existence by
noting,
They are not only genetically but also functionally identifiable as parts
of the male or female potential parents. Each has only half the genetic
material needed to guide the development of an immature human toward
full maturity, and none of these cells will survive long. They clearly are
destined either to combine with an ovum or sperm or to degenerate. Even
when they succeed in causing fertilization, they do not survive; rather,
their genetic (and cytoplasmic) material enters into the composition of a
distinct, new organism.
Id. at 120–21. In contrast with the gametes, they state:
The human embryo, from beginning of fertilization onward, is fully
programmed actively to develop himself or herself to the mature stage
of a human being. And unless deprived of a suitable environment or
prevented by accident or disease, this embryo will actively develop itself
in its own distinct direction, toward its own survival and maturity. The
direction of its growth is not extrinsically deter-mined, but is in accord
with the genetic information and cytoplasmic factors within it. The
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biological function of the human body is extinguished by death.29 Third, every
human person is, by definition, indistinguishable from his or her body, both
the person and the bodily organism constituting but one and the same entity.30
Accordingly, a human person is a particular form of physical organism that
integrates into one uniquely identifiable being both biological life and the
kinds of things that persons, by nature, have the capacity to do.31 The person
is an “embodied mind” or a “living bodily entity” rather than a consciousness
that possesses or inhabits a body, or a series of conscious experiences.32 In
short, one’s self, or person, is so inextricably identified with the human
physical organism that we are essentially bodily beings.33 Finally, every
human being is intrinsically valuable as a bearer of rights by virtue of what he
or she is.34 Just as no human being can come to be and later acquire intrinsic
human embryo is, then, a whole (though immature) and distinct human
organism—a human being.
Id. at 121.
29. The opposing perspective is radically different. LEE & GEORGE, supra
note 22, at 130–32. If a biological aspect of human life, such as consciousness, is
considered to be a merely extrinsic characteristic we ascribe to the human person,
it might be said that a person does not come into existence until the organism
begins to manifest those characteristics. Id. Further, this “dualism” view would
consider the human “person” and the human “organism” as distinct entities such
that the human person ceases to exist when the organism no longer manifests the
characteristics that are uniquely identified with personhood, even if the biological
organism itself is not yet dead. Id. This perspective, therefore, would assume that
a “person” is in some manner distinct from the bodily organism with which he or
she is identified. Many who advocate for a right to euthanasia would consider an
individual who is permanently unconscious as having ceased to exist as a human
person even though the same biological organism with which they “previously
were associated” continues to exist. Id. at 151–52. Thus, while they would agree
that it is wrong to kill a person, they claim that it is not necessarily wrong to kill
a human being who is not a person. Id.
30. LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22, at 130–32.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 132.
34. Professor Budziszewski relates the logic of attributing intrinsic value to
all human beings:
To be a person is to be a proper subject of absolute regard—a “neighbor”
in the sense of the Commandments—a being of the sort whom the
Commandments are about. It is persons whom I am not to kill, persons
whom I am to love as I love myself. But what is a person? If we accept
the biblical revelation that man is the imago Dei, the image of God, then
every human being is a person—a person by nature, a kind of thing
different from any other kind, a being whose very existence is a kind of
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sacrament, a sign of God’s grace. Trying to understand man without
recognizing him as the imago Dei is like trying to understand a bas-relief
without recognizing it as a carving. . . . In contemporary secular ethics,
the ruling tendency is to concede that there are such things as persons,
but to define them in terms of their functions or capacities—not by what
they are, . . . but by what they can do. . . . To give but a single wellknown illustration, philosopher Mary Ann Warren defines “personhood” in terms of consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, the
capacity to communicate about indefinitely many topics, and conceptual
self-awareness. If you can do all those things, you’re a person; if you
can’t, you’re not. The functional approach to personhood seems
plausible at first, just because—at a certain stage of development, and
barring misfortune—most persons do have those functions. But Warren
thinks persons are their functions . . . . [U]nborn babies are not capable
of reasoning, complex communication, and so on. . . . If unborn babies
may be killed because they lack these functions, then a great many other
individuals may also be killed for the same reasons—for example the
asleep, unconscious, demented, addicted, and very young, not to mention
sundry other cases such as deaf-mutes who have not been taught sign
language. . . . [We need] to stop confusing what persons are with what
they can typically do. . . . [A functional definition is] appropriate for
things that have no inherent nature, whose identity is dependent on our
purposes and interests—things which do not intrinsically deserve to be
regarded in a certain way, but which may be regarded in any way which
is convenient. For example, suppose I am building an automobile and I
need to keep two moving parts from touching each other. . . . Anything
can be a spacer which fills the space . . . . The particular lump of matter
I use to accomplish this purpose is not intrinsically a proper subject of
absolute regard; my regard for it—even its very identity as a spacer—is
relative to how I want to use it, or to what I find interesting about it. By
contrast, if I am a person, then I am by nature a rights-bearer, by nature
a proper subject of absolute regard—not because of what I can do, but
because of what I am. Of course this presupposes that I have a nature, a
“what-I-am”, which is distinct from the present condition or stage of
development of what I am, distinct from my abilities in that condition or
stage of development, and, in particular, distinct from how this
condition, stage of development, or set of abilities might happen to be
valued by other people. In short, a person is by nature someone whom it
is wrong to view merely functionally—wrong to value merely as a means
to the ends or the interests of others. If you regard me as a person only
because I am able to exercise certain capacities that interest you, then
you are saying that I am an object of your regard not in absolute but only
in a relative sense. . . . And so the functional definition of personhood
does not even rise to the dignity of being wrong.
J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN’T NOT KNOW 70–72 (2003).

2017]

SEEKING A DEFINITION OF MEDICAL FUTILITY

767

value, no human being can continue to be, but lose the intrinsic value imputed
to him or her as a subject of rights.35
These premises are consistent with the longstanding recognition in
American law that a patient’s right to express either an informed consent or a
knowing refusal of treatment is not conditioned upon a finding of decisional
capacity—to the contrary, that right both arises and is extinguished with the
patient’s life.36
II. DEFINING MEDICAL FUTILITY WITH REFERENCE TO THE ACT
The law concerning end-of-life decisions in the United States arose over
the past four decades as advances in medical technology enabled physicians
to sustain metabolic life well beyond the customary barriers of time and
physics by providing artificial means of respiration, circulation, nutrition, and
hydration.37 These interventions soon became problematic for physicians and
hospitals when surrogates for patients who were believed to be permanently
unconscious began to refuse treatment that offered an opportunity to extend
biological life indefinitely, though without any expectation that the patient
would return to a sapient state.38
When physicians expressed their hesitance to withhold or withdraw
treatment from such patients because of concerns about potentially adverse
legal and professional consequences, patient surrogates initiated legal
proceedings in which they sought judicial sanction.39 Out of these cases arose
35. Id.
36. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985) (“The right of an adult
who, like Claire Conroy, was once competent, to determine the course of her
medical treatment remains intact even when she is no longer able to assert that
right or to appreciate its effectuation.”); see generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,
supra note 1, at 170.
37. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270, 270 n.3
(1990). According to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Cruzan:
Medical technology . . . is often capable of resuscitating people after they
have stopped breathing or their hearts have stopped beating. Some of those
people are brought fully back to life. Two decades ago, those who were not
and could not swallow and digest food, died. Intravenous solutions could
not provide sufficient calories to maintain people for more than a short time.
Today, various forms of artificial feeding have been developed that are able
to keep people metabolically alive for years, even decades.
Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209; Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
39. See, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647; Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209; Cruzan, 497
U.S. 261.
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a fairly consistent body of jurisprudence that recognized one’s general right
to forego life-sustaining treatment.40 This right traditionally has been
understood as the natural corollary to the doctrine of informed consent: if a
physician is obligated to obtain a patient’s consent prior to providing
treatment, the clear inference is that the patient has a corresponding right to
refuse treatment.41
The jurisprudence42 eventually culminated in legislative responses in the
various states along the lines of the Act.43 Although these statutory schemes
vary somewhat from one state to another,44 they tend to embody two key
elements: first, they expressly recognize one’s right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment in certain narrowly defined circumstances; and second, they provide
immunity from liability for physicians who act in accordance with their
patients’ decisions to withhold or withdraw such measures.45
As a natural implication of the doctrine of informed consent, the
recognition of such a right is well-grounded in American law, and one’s
refusal of treatment generally is not controversial. It becomes problematic
from a legal perspective, however, when the refusal relates to treatment that
would either prevent the patient’s death or, if death is inevitable, extend his
life. This is so because a refusal of treatment in either of those cases would
bring the patient’s interest in self-determination into conflict with the state’s

40. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
41. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (“AngloAmerican law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination. It
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery,
or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form
of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.”).
42. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 2-3. Although
many of the early cases arose in the context of competent persons who objected
to treatment either on religious grounds or simply as a matter of personal
preference, the rapid emergence of advanced medical technology since the 1970s
provided the main impetus for the modern so-called “right-to-die” cases. Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 270. Such technology has enabled biological life to be sustained
almost indefinitely by a combination of devices for artificial respiration,
circulation, feeding, and hydration. See id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1 (2016).
44. See generally UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1993); UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989).
45. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-16–7-20.
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broader interests in preserving life,46 preventing suicide,47 preserving the
ethical integrity of the medical profession,48 and protecting members of
vulnerable groups.49
46. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1239 (N.J. 1985). Some
commentators have observed that the predominant jurisprudential trend is to view
the state’s specific interest in preserving the life of a particular individual as
dependent on that individual’s interest in preserving his own life, and that most
courts seem to have abandoned any effort to balance the individual’s right to
refuse treatment with the state’s interest in preserving life. See, e.g., HALL ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 531. The United States Supreme Court noted in Washington v.
Glucksberg, however, in the context of terminally ill patients who sought the
active assistance of a physician in bringing about their death that the states “may
properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular
individual may enjoy,” and “[t]his remains true, as Cruzan makes clear, even for
those who are near death.” 521 U.S. 702, 729–30 (1997) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 282). Without regard to the perceived momentum of the states toward
qualifying their interests in preserving life or otherwise in practice narrowing the
circumstances in which they might exercise it, that fact would not bear upon the
issue when the patient has affirmatively requested treatment. Meisel has
summarized the general judicial consensus concerning this right as follows: first,
patients, whether competent or incompetent, have both a common law and a
constitutional law right to refuse treatment. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA,
supra note 1, at 2-5. Second, the state’s interest in opposing a competent patient’s
right to forgo life-sustaining treatment is “virtually nonexistent,” and the state’s
interest is “very weak” with respect to incompetent patients who have a dim
prognosis for recovery, although the state likely would not disavow that interest
if the patient has chosen not to exercise his right to refuse treatment. Id. As noted
by Professor Meisel, “the right of self-determination has . . . traditionally been
thought to require that treatment not be forgone without the informed consent of
one legally authorized to provide it.” Id. at 2-25. Third, decisions about lifesustaining treatment generally should take place in the clinical setting, although
the courts are available to resolve disputes about those decisions. Id. Fourth,
surrogate decision makers for incompetent patients should express the patient’s
own preferences to the extent made known prior to the loss of capacity, and to the
extent the patient’s preference is unknown, decisions should be made on the basis
of the patient’s best interests. Id. Fifth, physicians and surrogates may rely on an
incompetent patient’s advance directive in ascertaining the patient’s preferences
concerning life-sustaining procedures. Id. Sixth, artificial nutrition and hydration
is a form of medical treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn under the same
conditions as other forms of medical treatment. Id. Seventh, the withholding or
withdrawal of medical treatment is both morally and ethically distinct from
euthanasia and assisted suicide, assuming that the patient has agreed to withhold
or withdraw treatment. Id.
47. See, e.g., Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223.
48. Id.
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Although the Act represents the legislature’s effort to balance these
competing interests, the statute itself reflects the inherent difficulty of
fulfilling that purpose. For example, the Act acknowledges in broad,
general terms that patients have a fundamental right to control decisions
relating to their medical care, and that this right encompasses the refusal
of life-sustaining clinical interventions.50 However, the law is vague in
terms of defining the ultimate scope of this liberty, expressly recognizing
only the right of terminally ill patients to refuse treatment that would
merely postpone the moment of death, and leaving open the question of
one’s right to withhold or withdraw other forms of treatment that offer a
reasonable prospect of reversing the dying process.51 Moreover, and in a
49. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 273 (1990).
50. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A) (2016) provides:
(1) The legislature finds that all persons have the fundamental right to
control the decisions relating to their own medical care, including the
decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in
instances where such persons are diagnosed as having a terminal and
irreversible condition. (2) The legislature further finds that the artificial
prolongation of life for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and
irreversible condition may cause loss of individual and personal dignity
and secure only a precarious and burdensome existence while providing
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the person . . . . (4) In
furtherance of the rights of such persons, the legislature finds and
declares that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to be the
exclusive means by which life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or
withdrawn, nor shall this Subpart be construed to require the application
of medically inappropriate treatment or life-sustaining procedures to any
patient or to interfere with medical judgment with respect to the
application of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures.
51. The Act, for example, expressly provides that a patient who has been
diagnosed as having a “terminal and irreversible condition” has the right to
withhold or withdraw “life-sustaining procedure[s],” which by definition serve
only to prolong the dying process. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(8), (14). The 1989
version of The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act is similarly limited to
“treatment that is merely life-prolonging, and to patients whose terminal condition
is incurable and irreversible, whose death will soon occur, and who are unable to
participate in treatment decisions.” UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT,
prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989). According to Meisel, “several” states
have adopted the URTIA in either its 1985 or 1989 version. MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-54–7-55. Other statutory schemes, however, are
broader in scope. For example, the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act
“acknowledges the right of a competent individual to decide all aspects of his or
her own health care in all circumstances, including the right to decline health care
or to direct that health care be discontinued, even if death ensues. . . . The Act
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manner consistent with the state’s interest in preserving life, the Act
expressly states that one’s right to refuse treatment is a voluntary matter
that rests solely within the patient’s discretion.52 In this manner, the statute
establishes that the law does not authorize, nor does it require, the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment in any particular case absent the
patient’s consent.53 Likewise, the law provides that it is not to be construed
as authorizing or condoning euthanasia.54 Taken together, it might be fair
to say that these provisions suggest a legislative intent to affirm and retain
the state’s traditional interest in preserving life when the patient has not
exercised his right to refuse treatment.
To give practical effect to the patient’s right of self-determination and
to encourage physicians to respect patient preferences, the statute
incorporates an immunity provision that insulates physicians from liability
when they withhold or withdraw treatment in accordance with their

recognizes and validates an individual’s authority to define the scope of an
instruction or agency as broadly or as narrowly as the individual chooses.” UNIF.
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993).
According to the Uniform Law Commission’s Legislative Fact Sheet, the UHCDA
had been adopted by Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, New Mexico,
and Wyoming as of 2014, although the advance directive statutes of some states
appear to be modified forms of the UHCDA. Legislative Fact Sheet–Health-Care
Decisions Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislative
FactSheet.aspx?title=Health-Care%20Decisions%20Act [https://perma.cc/3LWA5NAV] (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note
1, at 7-32–7-33, 7-63–7-89 (summarizing the law in this regard in other jurisdictions).
Notwithstanding the narrow scope of this statutory right, however, the Louisiana
statute, like similar schemes in other jurisdictions, expressly states that its provisions
are “cumulative with existing law.” See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(C). According
to Meisel, these schemes “are intended to preserve and supplement existing common
law and constitutional rights and not to supersede or limit them.” See MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-33–7-34.
52. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(1) & (2).
53. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B) provides:
(1) The legislature intends that the provisions of this Subpart are
permissive and voluntary. The legislature further intends that the making
of a declaration pursuant to this Subpart merely illustrates a means of
documenting a patient’s decision relative to withholding or withdrawal
of medical treatment or life-sustaining procedures. (2) It is the intent of
the legislature that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to require
the making of a declaration pursuant to this Subpart.
54. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(A). See also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra
note 1, at 7-102–7-103.
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patients’ wishes.55 Finally, the statute expressly denies any intent to
interfere with the exercise of “medical judgment”56 or to require the
provision of “medically inappropriate treatment.”57 These core provisions
of the Act directly shape both patient rights and physician obligations
during the course of the physician–patient relationship.
Although the legislature adopted the Act to recognize and further the
right of individuals to control decisions related to their medical care,
physicians occasionally have relied upon the statute not only to justify
their acquiescence to a patient’s decision to refuse treatment, but also to
substantiate their own decisions to deny treatment that a patient or his
authorized surrogate has expressly requested.58
Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center59 is an interesting example of
such a case. Sonya Causey, a 31-year-old quadriplegic who was comatose
and suffering from end-stage renal disease, was totally dependent on a
ventilator, regular hemodialysis, and the continuous provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration.60 These interventions constituted “life-sustaining
procedures” as defined in the Act, which expressly recognized the
authority of Sonya’s surrogate decision maker to refuse treatment on her
behalf.61
Although Sonya’s attending physician believed that continued
treatment could preserve her life for at least two additional years, he was
55. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7(A)(1), (C)(1); see also id. §
40:1151.8(B) (subjecting to criminal prosecution any persons who act in various
ways to cause the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment contrary
to the patient’s wishes). For similar immunity schemes in other jurisdictions see
UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, § 9 and UNIF. HEALTH-CARE
DECISIONS ACT, § 9. According to Meisel, “statutes do not confer wholesale
immunity; rather, most confer qualified immunity conditioned on the physician’s
acting in good faith and pursuant to reasonable medical standards.” MEISEL &
CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-149.
56. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(3).
57. Id. In contrast with the language of the Act, the UHCDA does not require
the provision of treatment that would be “medically ineffective.” UNIF. HEALTHCARE DECISIONS ACT, §§ 7(f), 13(d) (the comments to which define “medically
ineffective” as “treatment which would not offer . . . any significant benefit,” or
treatment that would be “contrary to generally accepted health-care standards”).
The URTIA similarly does not require the provision of treatment that would be
“contrary to reasonable medical standards.” UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY
ILL ACT, § 11(f).
58. See Pope, supra note 5.
59. 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
60. Id. at 1073, 1075–76.
61. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(8).
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of the opinion that Sonya had an insignificant chance of ever regaining
consciousness.62 He therefore recommended that treatment be withdrawn
and that Sonya be allowed to die.63 When her family insisted that treatment
be continued, the physician presented the case to the hospital’s Morals and
Ethics Board, which concurred with his recommendation.64 Treatment was
then withdrawn over the strong objection of Sonya’s family, and she died
shortly thereafter.65
In response to this action, members of Sonya’s family initiated a legal
proceeding in which they sought damages from the physician and the
hospital under the theory that they had committed an intentional tort in the
form of a battery.66 However, the trial court concluded that the case was
grounded in medical malpractice because the physician’s actions reflected
his “professional opinions and professional judgment.”67 The court thus
determined that the case was subject to the Medical Malpractice Act, 68
which required that it be submitted for consideration by a medical review
panel before judicial proceedings were initiated.69 The trial court then
dismissed the action as premature from a procedural perspective.70
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision.71 As
the case concerned the legal consequences of withdrawing life-sustaining

62. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1073.
63. Id. at 1074.
64. Id. The hospital had in place a “Futile Care Policy” that provided for
treatment to be discontinued if it had only a slight probability of improving the
patient’s condition. Id. at 1075.
65. Id. at 1074.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1073.
68. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.1 (2016).
69. Id. Louisiana conditions the jurisdiction of the courts in actions grounded
in medical malpractice and informed consent law upon the case first having been
submitted for review by a Medical Review Panel. See id. § 41:1231.8(A)(1)(a)–
(B)(1)(a). The Medical Practice Act defines “malpractice” as “any unintentional
tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional services
rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a
patient.” Id. § 40:1231.1(A)(13). “Health care means any act or treatment
performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by
any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient.” Id. § 40:1231.1(A)(9).
A physician’s failure to obtain either a patient’s informed consent or refusal for
treatment would constitute such a claim, and thus would be subject to the medical
review panel process. See id. § 40:1157.1(D).
70. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1073.
71. Id. at 1076.
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treatment, the court logically began its analysis with reference to the Act.72
Noting that the legislature had grounded its recognition of that right in the
concepts of patient autonomy, self-determination, and informed consent,73
the court pointed out that the facts of Causey were diametrically opposed
to those of the customary end-of-life dispute, in which physicians were
reluctant to accede to a surrogate’s request that treatment be withdrawn
and the patient be allowed to die.74 In Causey, the court said, “the roles are
reversed”:
Patients or, if incompetent, their surrogate decision-makers, are
demanding life-sustaining treatment regardless of its perceived
futility, while physicians are objecting to being compelled to
prolong life with procedures they consider futile. The right or
autonomy of the patient to refuse treatment is simply a severing
of the relationship with the physician. In this case, however, the
patient (through her surrogate) is not severing a relationship, but
demanding treatment the physician believes is “inappropriate.”
The problem is not with care that the physician believes is harmful
or literally has no effect. For example, radiation treatment for Mrs.
Causey’s condition would not have been appropriate. This is
arguably based on medical science. Rather, the problem is with
care that has an effect on the dying process, but which the
physician believes has no benefit. Such life-prolonging care is
grounded in beliefs and values about which people disagree.
Strictly speaking, if a physician can keep the patient alive, such
care is not medically or physiologically “futile;” however, it may
be “futile” on philosophical, religious or practical grounds.75
Finding the issue of futility to be “a subjective and nebulous concept
which, except in the strictest physiological sense, incorporates value
judgments,” and concluding that it would be “confusing” and “generate[]
polemical discussion” to focus on that concept, the court “turn[ed] instead
to an approach emphasizing the standard of medical care.”76 In doing so,
72. Id. at 1074.
73. Id. (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1075. The Causey court set the framework for its opinion on the
professional standard of care with an inferential reference to the doctrine of
informed consent, noting that “[t]he physician has an obligation to present all
medically acceptable treatment options for the patient or her surrogate to consider
and either choose or reject; however, this does not compel a physician to provide
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the court focused on the physician’s professional obligations as described
in the Act, which provides:
In furtherance of the rights of [terminally ill] persons, the legislature
finds and declares that nothing in this Subpart shall be construed to
be the exclusive means by which life-sustaining procedures may be
withheld or withdrawn, nor shall this Subpart be construed to
require the application of medically inappropriate treatment or lifesustaining procedures to any patient or to interfere with medical
judgment with respect to the application of medical treatment or
life-sustaining procedures.77
The court then concluded that “[a] finding that treatment is ‘medically
inappropriate’ by a consensus of physicians practicing in that specialty
translates into a standard of care”78 and affirmed the trial court’s decision
that the plaintiff’s claim should have been considered by a medical review
panel before litigation was initiated.79
It is not surprising that the court sought to evade the issue of medical
futility, particularly in light of the widely acknowledged difficulty of

interventions that in his view would be harmful, without effect or ‘medically
inappropriate.’” Id.
77. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4) (2016) (emphasis added).
78. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1076.
79. Id. There also was evidence that the physician based his defense, at least
in part, on his opinion that continued treatment would have been “medically
inappropriate” because he considered it to be inhumane. Id. at 1076 n.3. That fact
arguably would raise only the question of whether the patient would have given
consent to continuation of the treatment at issue. It is interesting to note that
Causey arose after treatment had been withdrawn and the patient had died. Id. at
1073. Had the defendants sought judicial sanction for the withdrawal of treatment
prior to acting, it is difficult to envision the court referring the case to a medical
review panel. Rather, one might expect the case to have received an expedited
judicial review to address the issue of whether the patient would have refused
continued treatment under the particular circumstances of the case. Although
resolution of that question might have required the same sort of expert testimony
that would inform the opinion of a medical review panel concerning whether the
patient suffered from a “terminal and irreversible condition,” and whether the
treatment at issue was a “life-sustaining procedure,” the ultimate issue would
focus on determining whether the patient would have given consent to continued
treatment if she were capable of expressing a reasoned decision on the matter.
That said, it is interesting to consider how the court might have approached the
issue had it been raised prospectively, rather than after the fact.

776

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

defining that concept in the abstract.80 However, a careful analysis of the
Act reveals that the court improperly invoked the Medical Malpractice Act
as the appropriate procedural reference point for resolving the case. More
specifically, the court’s error arose out of its conclusion that the
physician’s decision to withdraw treatment was grounded in the sort of
“medical judgment” with which the Act was intended not to interfere.81
By shifting its focus to the Medical Malpractice Act, the court in effect
adopted the professional standard of care to resolve an issue that the Act
would have addressed with reference to the patient’s subjective
preference.82

80. It is not surprising that the court sought an opportunity to demur in a case
such as this, which the courts have long considered to be more appropriately
within the realm of the legislature. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 407–08
(N.J. 1987) (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (N.J. 1985)) (“We
recognize, as we did in Conroy, and as have numerous other courts, that given the
fundamental societal questions that must be resolved, the Legislature is the proper
branch of government to set guidelines in this area[.] ‘Because the issue with all
its ramifications is fraught with complexity and encompasses the interests of the
law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which
is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type [of]
issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where fact finding
can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institutions and
disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can the subject
be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and individuals
be properly accommodated.’”); see also Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823,
833 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“The issues presented are profound and
universal in application. They warrant thoughtful study and debate not in the
context of overheated rhetoric in the battlefield of active litigation, . . . but in
thoughtful consideration by the Legislature as well as Executive agencies and
Commissions charged with developing the policies that impact on the lives of
all.”).
81. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075.
82. According to the Medical Malpractice Act, “the standard of care required
of every health care provider . . . in rendering professional services or health care
to a patient, shall be to exercise that degree of skill ordinarily employed, under
similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in good standing in the
same community or locality, and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with
his best judgment, in the application of his skill.” L A. REV. STAT. §
40:1231.1(A)(22).
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A. The Role of “Medical Judgment” in the Act and the Relationship
Between “Medically Inappropriate Treatment” and “Medical Futility”
Contrary to the court’s demurrer in Causey, a reasonable argument can
be made that the Act provides a meaningful reference point for reducing
the admittedly abstract philosophical notion of medical futility to a
workable legal standard. This argument is primarily grounded in a reading
of the statute in the context of its original purpose. More specifically, it
reflects the logical correlation between the concept of medical futility, the
state’s interest in the preservation of life, and the limited extent to which the
Act recognized the patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment. Just
as the statute establishes an objective threshold for defining a patient’s
unqualified right to refuse treatment, but without establishing the ultimate
scope of that right in the abstract, it likewise establishes the objective point
at which treatment becomes so “futile” that a physician has no obligation to
provide it, though without identifying the outside boundary of that duty.
Contemporary questions of medical futility tend to arise when
surrogates for patients who suffer from a “terminal and irreversible
condition” affirmatively request forms of treatment that would be classified
as “life-sustaining procedures” under the Act.83 Such interventions, by
definition, will not reverse the dying process brought about by the patient’s
underlying condition; rather, they will only postpone the moment of an
inevitable, though not necessarily impending, death. Futility issues are most
commonly encountered in the context of patients like Sonya Causey who
are believed to be permanently unconscious and whose lives might be
extended indefinitely through the use of clinical interventions such as
mechanical ventilation and the artificial administration of nutrition and
hydration.84 These questions directly implicate the law of informed consent

83. The Act defines a “life-sustaining procedure” as “any medical procedure
or intervention which, within reasonable medical judgment, would serve only to
prolong the dying process for a person diagnosed as having a terminal and
irreversible condition, including such procedures as the invasive administration
of nutrition and hydration and the administration of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.” Id. § 40:1151.1(A)(8). A “terminal and irreversible condition” is
defined as “a continual profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of
recovery or a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, within
reasonable medical judgment, would produce death and for which the application
of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to postpone the moment of death.”
Id. § 40:1151.1(A)(14).
84. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1073.
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and the patient’s correlative right to refuse treatment,85 as well as the state’s
recognized interest in the preservation of life.
As noted by the Second Circuit in Causey, the Act expressly disavows
any intention to interfere with the exercise of “medical judgement” or to
require that physicians provide “life-sustaining procedures” or treatment
that otherwise would be “medically inappropriate.”86 The court’s decision
to invoke the medical review panel process thus appears to rest on a
perceived link between the physician’s exercise of “medical judgment”
and his conclusion that it would have been “medically inappropriate” to
continue treatment under the circumstances.87
Although questions about the clinical propriety of a treatment protocol
inevitably bear upon the physician’s exercise of “medical judgment,” not all
determinations made by a physician in the course of the treatment
relationship necessarily fall within the scope of that term as it is employed
in the Act. This point is most apparent when a physician grounds a decision
to withdraw treatment based upon a subjective value judgment about certain
patient characteristics rather than a professional conclusion based on
medical expertise. It would be incoherent, for example, to argue that a
decision to withdraw treatment from a patient believed to permanently lack
decisional capacity is based on the physician’s exercise of “medical
judgment” unless he also would withdraw treatment from a similarly
situated patient who has a reasonable prospect of returning to a sapient state.
Moreover, a reasonable argument can be made that the Act does not
employ the term “medically inappropriate treatment” in a manner that
necessarily calls into question the professional standard of care that applies
under the Medical Malpractice Act.88 Rather, the meaning of that term as
85. The right of self-determination traditionally is understood as requiring the
patient’s consent before treatment is either withheld or withdrawn. See, e.g.,
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 2-25 & n.107. As a practical matter, it is
arguable that these cases are unlikely to be raised on the basis that the patient did
not give an informed consent because the patient would either have known, or
should have known, the risk or, more accurately, the certainty that accompanies
the withholding or withdrawal of treatment necessary to sustain life.
86. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075.
87. Id.
88. As noted above, the Causey court demurred on the substantive issue
posed by the facts of that case by employing the procedural rules of the Medical
Malpractice Act to deny jurisdiction pending a consideration of the case by a
medical review panel. Id. at 1076. Louisiana Revised Statute section
40:1231.8(A)(1)(a) provides that “[a]ll malpractice claims against health care
providers covered by this Part . . . shall be reviewed by a medical review panel.”
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.8(A)(1)(a). Section 40:1231.8(B)(1)(a)(i) provides that
“[n]o action against a health care provider . . . may be commenced in any court
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before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review
panel.” Id. § 40:1231.8(B)(1)(a)(i). Section 40:1231.1(A)(13) defines “malpractice”
as “any unintentional tort or any breach of contract based on health care or
professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health
care provider, to a patient.” Id. § 40:1231(A)(13). Cases concerning the scope of
the Medical Malpractice Act, however, suggest that it would have been inapposite
to Causey because it involved the sort of intentional tort not subject to the Act.
See, e.g., Sewell v. Doctors Hosp., 600 So. 2d 577, 578 (La. 1992) (noting that
the Medical Malpractice Act’s limitation on the liability of a health care provider
is a form of special legislation that is “in derogation of the rights of tort victims,”
that the Act should be strictly construed and thus limited to cases of malpractice
as expressly defined in the statute, and that “[a]ny other liability of the health care
provider to the patient is not subject to these limitations”); Coleman v. Deno, 813
So. 2d 303, 315 (La. 2002) (“[E]ven though all medical malpractice claims
[subject to the medical review panel process] are personal injury claims, ‘the
opposite is not true: every personal injury claim is not a medical malpractice
claim.’”) (quoting Scott E. Hamm, Note, Power v. Arlington Hospital: A Federal
Court End Run Around State Malpractice Limitations, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 335, 347–
48 (1993)); id. at 315–16 (setting forth a six-factor test to determine whether a
physician’s intentional tort is subject to the Medical Malpractice Act, one of
which is whether expert testimony is required in order to establish a physician’s
breach of duty); Pfiffner v. Correa, 643 So. 2d 1228, 1233 (La. 1994) (“[T]here
are situations in which expert testimony is not necessary [to establish a
physician’s breach of his professional obligations to a patient]. Expert testimony
is not required where the physician does an obviously careless act.”); Hastings v.
Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 448 So. 2d 713, 719 (La. 1987); Lagasse v. Tenet Health
Sys. Mem’l Med. Ctr. Inc., 83 So. 3d 70, 72 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that an
allegation of euthanasia is an intentional tort that is not covered by the Medical
Malpractice Act and, thus, need not be presented to a medical review panel prior
to initiating legal action for a judicial remedy). In the context of medical
malpractice, the issue of futility would go to a physician’s erroneous conclusion
about the efficacy of a particular treatment protocol, either because of an error in
the underlying diagnosis or concerning the efficacy of the regimen to improve the
patient’s condition. Absent any such error, it is arguable that a physician who
concludes that he has no obligation to honor a patient’s request for a particular
treatment regimen that would be expected to extend life would not be liable for
malpractice when he refuses to provide it, but for an intentional tort that is not
subject to the medical review panel process. The Medical Malpractice Act would,
however, apply to medical determinations concerning whether a patient suffers
from a “terminal and irreversible condition” or whether a proposed clinical
intervention constitutes a “life-sustaining procedure.” The facts recited in Causey,
however, do not indicate that such issues were raised.
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employed in the Act should be informed primarily by the statute’s intended
purpose of ensuring respect for the individual’s right of self-determination
while maintaining the integrity of the state’s interest in preserving life.89
B. The Sole Purpose of the Act was to Ensure Respect for the Patient’s
Preference Without Compromising the State’s Interest in Preserving Life
The Act was enacted with the singular purpose of giving effect to the
patient’s right to control decisions relating to his own medical care at the
end of life.90 Because this right is not conditioned on one’s decisional
capacity, the Act also recognizes the authority of a surrogate to refuse
treatment on behalf of a patient who did not express his wishes while
capable of doing so.91 Finally, a prospective refusal of treatment by a
capable person will survive a subsequent loss of capacity.92 Thus, the
statute reflects the legislative intent that the right to refuse treatment is a
matter that rests solely within the patient’s discretion and without regard
89. Reason suggests that the state’s interest in the integrity of the medical
profession is merely an extension of the state’s broader interest in the preservation
of life. Viewed from that perspective, one might say that when we talk about the
discretion of physicians in end-of-life care, we really are talking about them as
the point persons in giving effect to the state’s interest in preserving life as
reflected in various provisions of the Act. It is important to focus on the fact that
this is not a question of the physician’s interest versus the patient’s interest, but
the state’s interest versus the patient’s interest that the Act was intended to balance
and the Act’s increasing significance in light of financial constraints. Causey must
be viewed in that light.
90. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(1). More specifically, the statute
recognizes the right of terminally ill patients to refuse treatment that, by
definition, would serve only to postpone the moment of death. See id. §
40:1151(A); id. § 40:1151.1(8) (defining the “life-sustaining procedures” to
which the Act applies); id. § 40:1151.1(14) (defining a “terminal and irreversible
condition” upon a finding of which application of the statute depends); id. §
40:1151.1(11) (defining a “qualified patient” on behalf of whom the statute
authorizes a declaration to be made by a surrogate). Read together, these
provisions indicate that the statute does not apply to any form of treatment that
would reverse a patient’s terminal condition, although the statute expressly
incorporates one’s right to refuse treatment under general principles of law. See
id. § 1151.9(C) (providing that the provisions of the Act “are cumulative with
existing law pertaining to an individual’s right to consent or refuse to consent to
medical or surgical treatment”). Thus, the legislature did not intend to limit the
existence of a patient’s right to the narrow circumstances described in the statute,
but merely to limit its express recognition of the right to these most obvious cases.
91. Id. § 40:1151.4(A).
92. Id. § 40:1151.2(A).
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to whether the patient refuses treatment directly or indirectly through a
surrogate who speaks on his behalf.
The statute reflects this emphasis on the patient’s will in several ways.
For example, it declares that “all persons have the fundamental right to
control decisions relating to their own medical care,”93 that this right is
“permissive and voluntary,”94 and that the Act is not to be construed to
require any patient to make a declaration concerning the refusal of
treatment.95 Moreover, although the Act does not require patients to
declare their intentions concerning life-sustaining treatment in any
particular form, the statute sets forth an illustrative model that expressly
invites them not to give consent to the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment should they lack capacity when a decision becomes necessary.96
Contrary to these express provisions of the statute, the court’s analysis in
Causey would subject the patient’s right not to refuse treatment to the
consent of his physician.

93. Id. § 40:1151(A)(1).
94. Id. § 40:1151(A)(1), (B)(1)–(2).
95. Id. § 40:1151(B)(2).
96. 2005 La. Acts 2134. A patient’s declaration concerning life-sustaining
procedures may be in the following illustrative form:
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease or illness, or be
in a continual profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of
recovery, certified to be a terminal and irreversible by two physicians
who have personally examined me, one of whom shall be my attending
physician, and the physicians have determined that my death will occur
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized and where the
application of life-sustaining procedure would serve only to prolong
artificially the dying process, I direct (initial one only):
__That all life-sustaining procedures, including nutrition and hydration,
be withheld or withdrawn so that food and water will not be administered
invasively.
__That life-sustaining procedures, except nutrition and hydration, be
withheld or withdrawn so that food and water can be administered
invasively.
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.2(C)(1) (emphasis added). Although this illustrative
form expressly addresses only the patient’s decision either to receive or forego
the invasive administration of nutrition and hydration, the scope of the patient’s
acknowledged right to accept or refuse treatment under the Act would encompass
any intervention that constitutes a life-sustaining procedure which, by definition,
“would serve only to prolong the dying process.” Id. § 40:1151.1(A)(8). Thus, in
the case of Sonya Causey, that right would have related not only to the provision
of artificial nutrition and hydration, but also to dialysis and mechanical
ventilation.
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The holding in Causey also is inconsistent with the statute’s immunity
scheme, which insulates physicians from liability when they act to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in accordance with their
patients’ wishes.97 The legislature granted this immunity to alleviate a
physician’s concern about adverse legal and professional consequences
that might attend the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment, even when he acted at the patient’s request.98 Although this
provision only implicitly reflects the voluntary nature of the patient’s right
of refusal, it does so with a very practical force: the granting of immunity
is qualified by thinly veiled threats of civil and criminal liability to a
physician who withholds or withdraws treatment without the patient’s
consent.99 In this way, it reinforces the patient-centered focus of the law.100
The analysis in Causey is noticeably silent with respect to these key
provisions, each of which suggest that the court granted an undue
deference to the physician’s discretion. Finding the facts of the case to
present a question concerning the physician’s exercise of “medical
judgment”—because the physician had withdrawn treatment he
considered to be “medically inappropriate”—the court in effect shifted the
legal theory of the case from the Natural Death Act, which emphasizes the
“voluntary and permissive” nature of a patient’s right to accept or refuse
life-sustaining procedures,101 to the Medical Malpractice Act, which
invokes the professional standard of care to resolve allegations of
malpractice.102 By invoking the professional care standard of care,
however, the court made the patient’s right to direct the provision of care
subject to the physician’s approval. In light of that result, it is difficult to
97. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.7.
98. See id. § 40:1151.7(A)(1)–(2) (granting physicians and other health care
providers immunity from criminal prosecution, civil liability, and professional
sanctions, but only with respect to the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining procedures with the consent of the patient or an authorized surrogate).
See also id. § 40:1151.7(C)(1) (expressly denying immunity if it is shown that
“the person authorizing or effectuating the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining procedures . . . did not act in good faith compliance with the intention
of the . . . patient”); id. § 40:1151.8(B) (subjecting to criminal prosecution any
persons who act in various ways to cause the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment contrary to the patient’s wishes); id. § 40:1151.8(A)
(subjecting to civil liability persons who conceal a patient’s declaration reflecting
an intent to refuse treatment, presumably in order to circumvent the patient’s
choice to refuse treatment).
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
101. LA. REV. STAT. § 50:1151.1(B).
102. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
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reconcile the court’s construction of the terms “medical judgment” and
“medically inappropriate treatment” with the legislative intent underlying
the Natural Death Act.
A careful construction of the Act indicates that the legislature did not
employ these terms to recognize a physician’s unilateral authority to deny
life-sustaining treatment when the patient has not exercised his right to
refuse it. To the contrary, these terms must be construed in a manner that
furthers, rather than contradicts, the fundamental purpose of the statute.
When one considers the terms “medical judgment” and “medically
inappropriate treatment” in that context, reason suggests that the
legislature employed them only to deny a physician’s professional
obligation to provide interventions that are futile in a physiological sense
or that the patient has refused.
Under this construction, the statute implicitly would require the
application of life-sustaining procedures that a patient or an authorized
surrogate has requested.103 Although questions remain about the ultimate
scope of one’s right to refuse treatment in a constitutional sense, the
jurisprudence out of which the Act arose clearly establishes that these
decisions belong to the patient alone, and the terms of the Act lend
themselves to the same conclusion.104 Moreover, even if one were to find
ambiguity in the Act’s silence concerning the patient’s positive right to
compel the provision of “life-sustaining procedures” and, conversely,
concerning the physician’s unilateral authority to deny them, the statute
expressly provides that any ambiguities in the law are to be resolved in a
way that preserves human life.105

103. This would not be so with respect to interventions that are not medically
indicated because they are futile in an objective, physiological sense. The
physician would have no duty to provide such measures, nor would the patient
have the right to demand them.
104. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151(A)(1), 40:1151(A)(3), 40:1151(B); see
generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Quinlan,
355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Bouvia v Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In Re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
105. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(D). It is interesting to note that the Second
Circuit did not address the provisions of the Act that indicate the legislature’s
intention that the patient be recognized as the sole bearer of this right. Several
express provisions of the Act thus negate any argument that it would sanction the
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment that a patient or his
surrogate has requested. Rather, the court rested its opinion entirely on the
legislature’s more general expression of its “purpose, findings and intent” for
enacting the statute:
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Finally, not only does the Act contradict the Causey court’s construction
of the terms “medical judgment” and “medically inappropriate treatment,”
it employs those terms in a manner that informs the inquiry about the
definition of “medical futility” in the context of life-sustaining procedures.
C. The Statutory Meaning of the Term “Medical Judgment”
In a colloquial sense, and broadly speaking, the term “medical judgment”
might commonly be understood to reflect the outcome of the clinical decision
process. Although one might be inclined to see that process as objective in
nature, it is widely acknowledged that medical judgment is not purely
objective in an abstract, scientific sense, even when it concerns the
physiological efficacy of a particular intervention. Rather, the process of
interpreting data and determining the appropriate course of action in a
particular case is so inherently equivocal that it has been described as “a
science of uncertainty and an art of probability.”106
Although these uncertainties inevitably require physicians to exercise
professional discretion when analyzing objective data about the efficacy of
a clinical protocol, it is apparent from both the text and structure of the Act
that the legislature did not intend for the term “medical judgment” to
encompass all professional opinions in the end-of-life clinical setting. By its
very purpose, the Act directly and intentionally interferes with physician
judgments concerning the provision of life-sustaining procedures simply by
In recognizing a terminal patient's right to refuse care, La. R.S.
40:1299.58.1(A)(4) states that the statute is not to be construed “to
require the application of medically inappropriate treatment or lifesustaining procedures to any patient or to interfere with medical
judgment with respect to the application of medical treatment or lifesustaining procedures.”
Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075. Louisiana Revised Statute section
40:1299.58.1(A)(4) was re-codified without revision as section 40:1151(A)(4) in
2015. Then, noting that the statute did not define either “medical judgment” or
“medically inappropriate treatment,” the court concluded that a determination of
whether treatment is “medically inappropriate” necessarily entails the application
of the sort of “medical judgment” with which the Act was intended not to
interfere. Id.
106. One oft-cited adage illustrates this uncertainty in these terms: “Heaven
knows; who can tell? [W]ho shall decide when doctors disagree?” Quote of
unknown origin, cited in PETER MARK ROGET, ROGET’S THESAURUS 154 (1941).
Clinical medicine has been described as “a science of uncertainty and an art of
probability,” with “[t]he central task of clinicians [being] to reduce uncertainty to
the extent possible by using clinical data, medical science, and reasoning to reach
a diagnosis and propose a plan of care.” CLINICAL ETHICS, supra note 10, at 26.
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recognizing that patients possess the unqualified right to refuse them.107
From the opposite perspective, the Act would interfere with the clinical
judgment of a physician who might prescribe a lethal agent as a palliative
measure after determining that there is no other way to relieve a patient’s
unrelenting and intolerable pain. The Act directly interferes with a physician’s
judgment in these cases by expressly providing that it does not authorize or
condone either euthanasia or assisted suicide.108 In these ways, the statute
recognizes and constrains the scope of both the patient’s autonomy and the
physician’s discretion with respect to health care decisions at the end of life.
These legislative boundaries implicitly reflect the law’s intended
deference to a physician’s judgment under the Act. For example, a physician’s
diagnosis of a “terminal and irreversible condition” or classification of an
intervention as a “life-sustaining procedure” would clearly reflect the sort of
judgment with which the statute is intended not to interfere. Professional
judgments concerning the physiological efficacy of potential clinical
interventions would also operate independently of the Act.109 Disputes
about such professional judgments, therefore, would be subject to the legal
standards and procedural requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act.
However, such professional judgments are unlike the profound
personal decisions that patients and their families face when considering
whether to accept or refuse life-sustaining interventions. As these
decisions implicate intensely personal considerations that are both unique
to the patient and wholly unrelated to the exercise of medical judgment,
the statute expressly places them within the sole discretion of the patient
107. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151.2(A)(1), 40:1151.4(A)(1), 40:1151.4(A)(2)
(2016). The Act expressly recognizes the authority of a surrogate to refuse such
treatment on behalf of a patient who lacks decisional capacity.
108. Id. § 40:1151.9(A).
109. It is interesting to note that Causey did not involve a dispute about such
matters of professional discretion. Although the court did not expressly hold either
that the patient suffered from a “terminal and irreversible condition” or that the
procedures at issue constituted “life-sustaining procedures” as defined in the Act,
the facts of the case, together with the inference drawn from the court’s reference
to the Act as the appropriate rule of law for deciding it, strongly imply that the
case did fall within the scope of the statute. See Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1074 (Sonya
Causey was believed to be permanently unconscious, and she was dependent on
hemodialysis, mechanical ventilation, and artificially administered nutrition and
hydration, all of which constituted “life-sustaining procedures.”). The opinion
further suggests that, in framing the issue, the court considered the physician’s
decision to withdraw treatment as a reflection of his “medical judgment” about
whether it would have been “medically inappropriate” to continue it under the
circumstances. Though not expressly stated, the court’s analysis clearly rests on
these premises.
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or an authorized surrogate.110 Although the need for these decisions arises
out of a physician’s exercise of professional medical judgment concerning
the patient’s status under the Act, the statute invokes the patient’s
preference as the sole reference point for deciding whether treatment
should be provided.111
In essence, it might be said that the statute implicitly recognizes a
meaningful distinction between the patient’s right to refuse treatment and
the physician’s authority to bring about death, whether directly by
employing an active intervention or indirectly by refusing to honor a
request for treatment that reasonably would be expected to prolong the
patient’s life. The narrow statutory definition of a “life-sustaining
procedure” reflects this fundamental distinction, which the Act reinforces
by expressing the voluntary and permissive nature of the patient’s right to
refuse treatment.112 Thus, the Act consummates its intended purpose by
limiting the definition of “medical judgment” to clinical decisions that
reflect a physician’s professional, clinical opinion, rather than his personal
or philosophical perspective. The expansive view of medical judgment
adopted in Causey, however, would contradict the legislative purpose of
the Act.
D. The Statutory Meaning of the Term “Medically Inappropriate
Treatment” and its Relationship to the Concept of Medical Futility
In addition to expressing a virtually boundless view of “medical
judgment,” the opinion in Causey rested on the premise that a physician
necessarily employs such judgment when determining if it would be
“medically inappropriate” to provide a life-sustaining procedure.113 It is
self-evident that all clinical decisions inevitably reflect the exercise of
some degree of medical judgment. Nevertheless, the underlying purpose
of the Act suggests that the professional standard of care by which
110. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151.2, 1151.4.
111. Id. §§ 40:1151(A)(1), 1151(A)(3), 1151(B)(1)(2).
112. Id. § 40:1151(B)(1), (2).
113. According to the court,
Standards of medical malpractice require a physician to act with the degree
of skill and care ordinarily possessed by those in that same medical specialty
acting under the same or similar circumstances. Departure from this
prevailing standard of care, coupled with harm, may result in professional
malpractice liability. A finding that treatment is “medically inappropriate”
by a consensus of physicians practicing in that specialty translates into a
standard of care.
Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1076 (citing LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.41).
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expressions of medical judgment are measured does not inform the
intended meaning of “medically inappropriate treatment.”114 Rather,
considered in context, the term should be construed first in contrast to the
term “life-sustaining procedure,” against which it is juxtaposed in the
statute, and second with reference to treatment—whether life-sustaining
or not—that the patient has, in fact, refused.115 Considered within these
parameters, a medical intervention would be found inappropriate under the
Act either if the patient has refused it, or if it is futile in an objective,
physiological sense. By definition, a “life-sustaining procedure” that a
patient has requested would satisfy neither of these tests.116
The specific statutory provision at issue in Causey provides that it is
“not to be construed ‘to require the application of medically inappropriate
treatment or life-sustaining procedures to any patient.’”117 The statute’s use
114. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4).
115. Id. § 40:1151(B)(3). Under this construction, the term “medical
judgment” would have meaning for purposes of determining whether a patient’s
condition is “terminal and irreversible,” or if the treatment at issue is a “lifesustaining procedure.” Id. § 40:1151(A)(2). Once those determinations have been
made, the question of whether treatment should be provided would require not the
exercise of medical judgment, but the consent of the patient. Id. § 40:1151(A)(2).
116. With respect to the patient’s right to refuse measures that lie beyond the
narrow scope of the Act, however, the question is somewhat more nebulous
because it is sprinkled with a less certain mix of traditional principles of law
concerning end-of-life care. Nevertheless, the Act expressly provides that its
terms are “cumulative with existing law” concerning the patient’s right to accept
or refuse treatment, the threshold of which, theoretically, would arise at the point
where the individual’s interest in autonomy outweighs the state’s interest in the
preservation of life. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(C). For example, In re
Quackenbush involved a patient with decisional capacity who refused an
amputation that his physician expected to save his life, and without which death
was certain. 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Morris Cty. Ct. 1978). Although this procedure
was not futile in a physiological sense, the court found that he had the right to
refuse it. Id. at 790. One might expect the same result in Louisiana. In such cases,
the procedure would be “medically inappropriate” simply because the patient
refused it, even though it would not have been a life-sustaining procedure under
the Act and thus not subject to the absolute right of refusal as recognized in the
statute.
117. Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075 (first quoting LA. REV. STAT. §
40:1151(A)(4), and then quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(3)) (emphasis
added). Under this construction, the term “medical judgment” would have
meaning for purposes of determining whether a patient is terminally ill or if the
treatment at issue is a “life-sustaining procedure.” Once those determinations have
been made, the question of whether the treatment should be provided would
require not the exercise of medical judgment, but the consent of the patient.
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of the disjunctive “or” to separate these terms suggests quite strongly a
legislative intent to treat them independently.118 This grammatical basis for
the distinction is buttressed by the fact that a synonymous construction
would yield a result contrary to the stated purpose of the law by creating an
obligation on the part of the patient to refuse treatment, rather than merely
recognizing one’s right to do so.119 By construing the statute as recognizing
a physician’s authority to declare a life-sustaining procedure as “medically
inappropriate,” the court’s analysis in Causey would effectively condition a
patient’s right to refuse treatment on the physician’s consent, thus negating
the voluntary nature of that right as expressly defined in the law, and
rendering the statute internally inconsistent.120 This result could be avoided
only by construing these terms separately. This is not to deny that there
are occasions when it might be medically inappropriate for a physician to
provide a life-sustaining procedure, but to say merely that these terms need
not universally be construed as synonymous, and that they sometimes must
be distinguished to give effect to the statute’s underlying purpose.
The necessity of drawing a distinction between a life-sustaining
procedure and treatment that is medically inappropriate can also be
demonstrated by categorizing treatment modalities in terms of their
expected efficacies and then correlating them with the patient’s right to
accept or refuse treatment, the state’s countervailing interest in the
preservation of life, and the physician’s professional obligations. This
approach not only clarifies the meaning of these key terms in the statute,
but also leads to a very practical definition of futility that comports with
the voluntary nature of the patient’s right as recognized in the Act.121
As the Act was intended to establish a reasonable balance between the
competing interests of the individual in exercising his autonomy and the
state in the preservation of life, reason posits that the state waived that
interest to the extent the legislature expressly recognized a patient’s
unqualified right to refuse treatment.122 Logic further suggests that the
state’s interest in preserving life is, by definition, a function of the

118. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151(A)(4), 40:1151(B)(3).
119. See id. § 40:1299.58.1(B)(1)–(2).
120. Causey, 719 So. 2d 1072; LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4). The holding
in Causey also would deny the term “medically inappropriate treatment” any
substantive effect. It would be meaningless to say that it encompasses clinical
interventions that lack physiological efficacy simply because the law has never
obligated physicians to provide measures that are futile in an objective,
physiological sense.
121. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(1).
122. Id. §§ 40:1151(A), 1151.2, 1151.4.
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professional expectation that a clinical intervention will positively affect a
patient’s injury, illness, or disease in a physiological sense.
The concept of medical futility can be seen as an inverted function of
the same expectancy. Under this view, the state’s interest and the concept
of futility would lie at opposite ends of the same spectrum: as the expected
benefit from a particular treatment protocol increases, the state’s interest
grows and futility dims. Likewise, the state’s interest becomes ever more
dim as the expected benefit declines, making it increasingly futile. This
gradation of treatment along the spectrum of futility versus efficacy is
similar to the correlation historically drawn by the courts between the
individual’s right to refuse treatment and the state’s interest in preserving
life—the individual’s right grows and the state’s interest diminishes as the
degree of invasiveness increases and as the prognosis dims.123
In this sense, the concept of medical futility and the scope of a patient’s
abstract, constitutional right to refuse treatment are correlative and thus
subject to equal degrees of ambiguity. Yet, this analysis offers a meaningful
and workable definition of futility in the context of the Act, and it does so
without violating the purpose of the statute. It is self-evident that the law
would universally define as both “medically inappropriate” and objectively
“futile” any intervention that offers no prospect of relieving, mitigating, or
deterring the progression of a patient’s illness, disease, or injury.124 Such
interventions would be absolutely futile in a physiological sense. It follows
that neither the professional standard of care nor the state’s interest in
preserving life would obligate a physician to provide such measures, nor
would the law recognize a patient’s right to demand them.125
123. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (“The nature of
Karen’s care and the realistic chances of her recovery are quite unlike those of the
patients discussed in many of the cases where treatments were ordered. In many
of those cases the medical procedure required (usually a transfusion) constituted
a minimal bodily invasion and the chances of recovery and return to functioning
life were very good. We think that the state’s interest contra weakens and the
individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s rights
overcome the State interest.”).
124. Physicians are not ethically obligated to provide care that has no
reasonable chance of benefiting their patients. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2016) (“Chapter 5: Opinions on Caring for Patients at the
End of Life”), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medicalethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2035.page? [https://perma.cc/V3CY-TPA7].
125. The President’s Commission on Bioethics explains a physician’s ethical
duties in this regard as follows:
A health care professional has an obligation to allow a patient to choose from
among medically acceptable treatment options (whether provided by the
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However, such objectively inappropriate interventions differ
significantly from life-sustaining procedures. These measures, by definition,
yield an identifiable physiological effect in the sense that they postpone the
moment of death, though without offering any hope of an ultimate
remedy.126 In light of this benefit, it would seriously distort the traditional
balance in the physician–patient relationship if the law were to place a
patient’s affirmative request for such measures at the discretion of his
physician by treating them as a matter subject to the exercise of medical
judgment. This conclusion is grounded both in the doctrine of informed
consent and in the statute, which clearly recognizes that the patient’s right
to direct the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures is a
permissive right rather than a legal duty.127 It also is in accord with
fundamental principles of bioethics that reflect the patient’s right of selfdetermination. According to the President’s Commission on Bioethics,
Respect for the self-determination of competent patients is of
special importance in decisions to forego life-sustaining treatment
because different people will have markedly different needs and
concerns during the final period of their lives; living a little longer
will be of distinctly different value to them. Decisions about lifesustaining treatment, which commonly affect more than one goal
of a patient (for example, prolongation of life and relief of
suffering) create special tensions. Nonetheless, a process of
collaborating and sharing information and responsibility between
care givers and patients generally results in mutually satisfactory
decisions. Even when it does not, the primacy of a patient’s
interests in self-determination and in honoring the patient’s own
view of well-being warrant leaving with the patient the final
authority to decide.128
Two legal consequences might be inferred from a patient’s decision to
exercise this right: first, that the state’s interest in preserving life is
implicitly and automatically waived when a patient refuses a lifeprofessional or by appropriate colleagues to whom the patient is referred) or
to reject all options. No one, however, has an obligation to provide
interventions that would, in his or her judgment, be countertherapeutic.
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
TREATMENT DECISIONS 44 (1983).
126. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.1(8), (14).
127. Id. § 40:1151(B)(1), (2).
128. Id.
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sustaining procedure; and second, that it would be “medically
inappropriate” for a physician to provide such treatment after the patient
has refused it. In this sense, the patient’s refusal of treatment would reflect
his own subjective determination that it would be “futile” for him to
receive a life-sustaining procedure, without regard to the unique, personal
reasons that might have led him to make that choice. In effect, this
approach would define futility with reference to the patient’s subjective
preference, as justified by the voluntary nature of his right under the statute
either to accept or refuse treatment. Thus, the law would define any “lifesustaining procedure” as both “medically inappropriate” and “futile” if, in
fact, the patient has declined it.129
129. Id. § 40:1151(A)(4). The same logic would support a definition of
treatment as futile if it would cause such intolerable and interminable pain to a
patient who, though conscious, permanently lacks decision-making capacity. In
those circumstances, the courts might infer the patient’s decision to refuse
treatment under either the pure or the limited objective tests as developed by the
court in In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). The facts of Causey also raise
the issue of whether the physician’s unilateral act of withdrawing life-sustaining
procedures would be legitimated by the fact that continued treatment would have
been inhumane. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App.
1998). The professional standard arguably would be relevant if the patient has not
directed the withdrawal of treatment and is suffering in which event it might be
appropriate to apply a version of either the “pure objective” or “limited objective”
tests developed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy when addressing the
propriety of a physician’s unilateral decision to withdraw a life-sustaining
procedure; a determination that the patient was suffering arguably would be
subject to the professional standard and, thus, to review by a medical review panel.
Conroy, 489 A.2d 1209. The Conroy court employed these tests to find a
presumption that the patient would have refused treatment if he were capable of
arriving at a reasoned decision. Id. Under the “pure objective” test, treatment may
be withheld or withdrawn even in the absence of any evidence that the patient
would have refused care as long as he is suffering intolerable and intractable pain,
such that treatment would be inhumane. The related “limited objective” test would
apply where there exists “some evidence” that the patient would have refused
treatment, and where the burdens of treatment “clearly and markedly outweigh”
the benefits of that treatment. Neither the “pure objective” or “limited objective”
test, however, would justify a physician’s unilateral decision to withhold or
withdraw a “life-sustaining procedure.” Rather, these tests would be consistent
with the voluntary nature of the patient’s decision to refuse treatment, because
they merely provide a means of inferring whether the patient would exercise that
right if he were capable of expressing a reasoned choice. Further, the objective
tests developed in Conroy are interesting when applied to a case like Causey,
because they were devised to address the withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment from conscious, but incompetent patients in a nursing home
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Reason compels the opposite conclusion when a patient or his surrogate
requests a life-sustaining procedure.130 The Act reflects the legislature’s
intent to retain the state’s interest in preserving life in such cases, as
evidenced by the narrow scope of the term “life-sustaining procedure,” the
explicitly voluntary nature of the patient’s right to refuse such measures,
and the requirement that any doubt concerning application of the statute
be resolved in favor of preserving life.131
Finally, a rational extension of this logic also suggests something
further—that the Act reflects the legislative intent not only to retain the
state’s interest in preserving life when the patient has not exercised his
right to refuse a life-sustaining procedure, but implicitly to translate that
interest into the patient’s correlative right to insist that the physician
provide it. In short, the voluntary nature of a patient’s “negative” right to
refuse treatment that will merely postpone the moment of death implicitly
affords a corresponding “positive” right to compel its provision, and the
state’s interest in preserving life continues unabated with respect to those
interventions until such time as the patient has, in fact, refused them. To
construe the law in any other manner would permit physicians to
unilaterally withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures, thereby
defeating both the voluntary nature of the patient’s decision either to
accept or refuse such treatment and the very purpose of the Act.

who tend to be subjected to a more significant risk of abuse than patients in the
hospital setting. The patient in Causey, however, not only was unconscious, but
she was in the hospital where regular physician consultations and ethics
committee reviews were available. Causey, 719 So. 2d 1072. The hospital in fact
had submitted the case for review by the ethics committee, which found that
treatment should be withdrawn even over the objection of the patient’s surrogate
decision maker, and the physician defended his decision to withdraw treatment on
the grounds that the patient was suffering. Id. To withhold treatment from a patient
who is suffering would be justified, however, not on the grounds of “futility,” but
by the inference that the patient would have refused it.
130. This is not to say that the patient’s silence is to be taken either as an
implicit acceptance or as a refusal of treatment, but that the core issue relates to
the determination of whether the patient would have refused or accepted the
treatment if he were capable of expressing a reasoned decision. As a matter of
custom, such determinations are made with reference to the substituted judgment
standard. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
131. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(E). (“It is the policy of the state of
Louisiana that human life is of the highest and inestimable value through natural
death. When interpreting this Subpart, any ambiguity shall be interpreted to
preserve human life . . . .”).
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III. RESOLVING THE UNCERTAIN STATE OF THE LAW CONCERNING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACT AND MEDICAL FUTILITY
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Causey reflects the law’s continuing
struggle with the notion of medical futility, both in the abstract and in the
context of the statute. Although the Causey court was understandably
reluctant to address the issue from a philosophical perspective, it found no
greater comfort in the specific provisions of the Act. As argued in this
Article, however, the case might have been resolved with greater certainty
had the court considered the definition of “medically inappropriate
treatment” both as a sui generis term and in light of the statute’s structure
and purpose.132 In this manner, the court could have concluded that the
treatment at issue was neither futile nor medically inappropriate.
Although the Act can be construed in a way that effectively defines
futile care with reference to the patient’s decision to accept or refuse
treatment, it is important to bear in mind that it would do so more by
coincidence than design. The correlation of the patient’s choice to the
definition is inferential rather than direct because the statute was drafted
not to provide an express definition of medical futility, but to give effect
to a patient’s basic right to grant or deny consent to treatment.133 However,
construing the statute in such a way that recognizes a physician’s authority
to deny the very treatment it places at the patient’s discretion would be
inconsistent with the statute’s purpose. Thus, while a patient’s refusal of a
particular form of treatment might establish a basis for defining it as both
futile and medically inappropriate, it is the exercise of his right to accept
or refuse treatment on which those definitions turn. In short, the mere fact
that treatment would be considered futile if the patient were to refuse it
does not render it inherently futile and therefore beyond his right to accept.
It is this subtle point that the Causey court overlooked.134
132. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(A)(4); see Pope, supra note 5, at 41–42
nn.214–217, 72–74 nn.423–437, 78 n.466.
133. See generally MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 7-16.
134. Causey, 719 So. 2d 1072. Although this construction of the Act would
have equal merit under similar schemes in other states, the literal terms of some
statutes, such as the Uniform Act, do not as readily lend themselves to that view.
Some commentators strongly contend that the literal terms of the Uniform Act
accommodate a physician’s unilateral withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment. For a comprehensive discussion of this view see generally
Pope, supra note 5. This potential disparity among the states is ironic when one
considers the fact that many bioethicists initially were concerned that the
complexity and limited immunity provisions found in these schemes might lead
physicians to construe them narrowly, thus effectively constraining rather than
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The Causey court’s construction of the Act as conferring unilateral
decision-making authority on physicians neither resolves nor informs the
substance of the ongoing futility debate. Nor does it relieve physicians of
the potentially significant legal consequences that would follow a
unilateral decision to withhold or withdraw treatment from a patient who
has not refused it. Moreover, to construe the statute in that manner would
not reduce the likelihood of judicial involvement in these questions, which
the courts have long regarded as more amenable to resolution in the
clinical setting by consensus among physicians, patients, and family
members than in the adversarial environment of litigation. To the contrary,
it likely would generate litigation in a significant number of cases.
The conflicting arguments about how the statute should be construed
in the context of questions about medical futility suggest that the law might
not offer a certain resolution to this significant issue. Perhaps in
recognition of that continuing uncertainty, statutory methods have been
proposed to resolve, on an ad hoc basis, the impasse created when patients
or their surrogates request treatment that physicians believe to be
inappropriate under the circumstances.135 For example, Texas has enacted
a statute under which a physician who opposes a request for life-sustaining
treatment may initiate a review of the case by the hospital ethics
committee.136 Perhaps to ensure due process and enhance the opportunity
of building a consensus about the appropriate course of action, the law
confers upon the patient’s surrogate the right to attend the meeting.137 If
the committee concludes that it would be inappropriate to continue
treatment under the circumstances of the case, the physician would be
obligated both to make a reasonable attempt to transfer the patient to
another facility that is willing to comply with his directive 138 and to
continue providing care for ten days after the ethics committee’s
reinforcing the patient’s ability to refuse treatment without first seeking judicial
approval. The potential for such mischief in the codification of these schemes was
seen, not in the risk that physicians would deny care that a patient had requested,
but that they would insist on providing care the patient did not want. See generally
MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1. The contemporary argument that advance
directive statutes should be construed to remove end-of-life decisions from the
subjective preference of patients and place them within the professional discretion
of physicians is difficult to reconcile to this history.
135. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (West 2016).
136. Id. § 166.046(a). The Texas statute does not attempt to define medical
futility, but provides a legal process for resolving disputes about the propriety of
continued treatment. See Pope, supra note 5, at 80.
137. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046(b)(2), (4).
138. Id. § 166.046(d).
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decision.139 The statute authorizes the termination of treatment if the patient
has not been not transferred within the prescribed ten-day window.140
Although this process-based approach appears to have been well
received, questions have been raised about certain provisions of the Texas
statute. For example, some suggest that the ten-day transfer window might
not provide a meaningful period of time within which to locate a facility
and effect the patient’s transfer.141 Questions also have been presented
about whether the judicial authority142 to extend the transfer deadline is
deficient in terms of process.143 Finally, concerns have been expressed
about potential due process implications arising from conflicts of interest
posed by the composition of the ethics committee charged with reviewing
a physician’s denial of treatment.144
These questions aside, a process-based approach would seem to offer
a more practical and meaningful way to resolve disputes about medical
futility than an ambiguous advance directive statute such as the Act would
afford. Such a scheme would be most meaningful if the Act minimized the
potential for disputes at the outset. In the context of life-sustaining
modalities, the potential for conflict most likely would arise if the statute
were construed to accord physicians the unilateral authority to withhold or
withdraw treatment from a patient who has not refused it.145 As a
139. Id. § 166.046(e).
140. Id. Although commentators report that this scheme appears to have
significantly increased ethics consultations in Texas, they also note that providers
rarely invoke their authority under the statute to withdraw treatment unilaterally
in cases that ultimately prove to be intractable. See Pope, supra note 5, at 69
(noting that Texas providers decided to unilaterally stop life-sustaining medical
treatment only in 2% of intractable cases).
141. Pope, supra note 5, at 80.
142. HEALTH & SAFETY § 166.046(g).
143. See Nikolouzos v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 162 S.W.3d 678, 684
(Tex. App. 2005) (Fowler, J., concurring) (recommending that the statute be
clarified with respect to the court’s authority to grant an extension by identifying
the court in which the petition to extend the time for transfer must be filed by
specifying the process for an appeal when a court refuses to grant an extension).
144. See Pope, supra note 5, at 80.
145. Several amici in the assisted suicide cases of Washington v. Glucksberg
and Vacco v. Quill emphasized the importance of insulating physicians from
increasing pressures brought to bear on them by society to assist patients in ending
their lives when nothing further can be done for them. See, e.g., Brief for Bioethics
Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 657754; Brief of Family
Research Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 96-110, 95-1858), 1996 WL 656275. For

796

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

preliminary matter, a dispute resolution scheme would be most effective
in Louisiana if it were coupled with a provision in the Act that clearly
negates any such authority.
Having established that foundation, a scheme along the lines of the
Texas statute might offer a viable framework for establishing a process to
resolve futility-related disputes in Louisiana, but with three modifications.
First, the scheme should abate the potential for conflicts of interest due to
the composition of the ethics committee by ensuring that it is composed of
persons not affiliated either with the health care facility or the physicians
involved in the patient’s care in a way that would call their independence
into question and thus compromise, by perception, the integrity of the
review process. Second, it should give the committee sufficient flexibility
and time either to build a consensus concerning the appropriate course of
treatment or to shape a practical compromise when no consensus is
possible.146 Third, it should provide for an expedited process for judicial
example, Professors Annas, Glanz, and Mariner stated, “[P]hysician assisted
suicide is recognized, even by the two Circuit Courts of Appeal that have asserted
that it is a constitutional right, as far too dangerous a right to be exercised by
patients and physicians alone.” Brief for Bioethics Professors, supra, at 29. The
Family Research Council made a similar point: “[The Hippocratic Oath’s
proscription against a physician doing harm to patients] . . . is a priceless
possession which we cannot afford to tarnish, but society is always attempting to
make the physician into a killer—to kill the defective child at birth, to leave the
sleeping pills beside the bed of the cancer patient . . . . [I]t is the duty of society
to protect the physician from such requests.” Brief of Family Research Council,
supra, at 4 (quoting MAURICE LEVINE, PSYCHIATRY & ETHICS 324–25 (1972)).
146. One of the most significant ways to enhance the potential for building a
consensus is by refusing to charge the physician with the responsibility that
inevitably would attend the unilateral authority to deny treatment. Moreover, the
very fact that an independent committee would be available to review a proposal
to withhold or withdraw care might be likely to avoid the creation of adversarial
relationships as the course of treatment progresses. Knowledge that a committee
will be available for review might itself either enhance the development of trust
or diminish the likelihood of distrust as care progresses. Like many conflicts,
disagreements about the provision of treatment are often based on personal
misunderstandings between the parties and distrust. Two of the key factors likely
to engender a lack of trust in the medical profession in the context of a physician’s
denial of life-sustaining treatment are the potential for financial conflicts of
interest and the diminished respect perceived by terminally ill, disabled, and
elderly patients relative to those who are young and healthy. According to the
American Geriatrics Society, in light of how concerns about physician-assisted
suicide are magnified by managed care cost constraints,
Patients nearing death are generally quite disabled and their care is
costly. . . . Decreasing availability and increasing expense in health care
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review should the committee be unsuccessful in forging either a consensus
or a practical compromise to which both physicians and patient surrogates
agree.
A statutory protocol possessing these features would recognize that
questions about a patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment do not
directly relate to the exercise of professional medical judgment. Rather,
questions of a professional nature relate primarily to conclusions about
whether a particular form of treatment constitutes a life-sustaining
procedure within the meaning of the Act, or whether the patient either
suffers from a terminal and irreversible condition or is in a continual and
profound comatose state with no reasonable chance of recovery.
Non-diagnostic questions concerning whether a life-sustaining
procedure should be applied in a particular case, on the other hand, pose
issues of fact about whether the patient would have accepted or refused
treatment had he possessed the capacity to express a reasoned decision
about the matter. Because those questions are more subject to legal
evidentiary standards than professional medical standards, they are not
properly the subject of a physician’s professional discretion.

and the uncertain impact of managed care may intensify pressure to
choose [physician-assisted suicide]. . . . [Physician-assisted suicide] may
become inherently coercive in a society in which supportive services and
medical care are often unavailable. It would be ironic, indeed, to have a
constitutional right to [physician-assisted suicide] when there is no
guarantee of access to health care.
Brief of the American Geriatrics Society at 24–25, Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 95-1858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656290. The National
Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities and the Knights of Columbus raised
a similar concern about the compounded risks posed by the inter-working of
managed care cost constraints and discrimination based on disabilities:
In the end, a condition-based rule in favor of assisted suicide would pour
into the Constitution a poisonous concoction of warm-hearted, misguided
pity and cold-hearted utilitarianism. . . . Who stands to benefit most from
a constitutional policy by which the right to live of vulnerable persons is
reduced to an alienable interest? Is it the person with a terminal condition
bent on suicide regardless of what the Constitution holds, or is it a costconscience society seeking more ways to ration its generosity?
Brief of the National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities and the Knights
of Columbus at 22, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Nos. 951858, 96-110), 1996 WL 656342. Although these are arguments related to
physician-assisted suicide, the same concerns would seem relevant to the more
passive means of inducing death by vesting in physicians the unilateral authority
to deny life-sustaining treatment.
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Finally, by subjecting unresolved cases to judicial review, such a
statutory process would give effect to the well-established rule of law that
a patient’s right either to accept or refuse treatment survives the loss of
capacity, thus clearly denying any lawful authority on the part of a
physician to unilaterally withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment
based on the patient’s lack of capacity or any other perceived deficit in
terms of quality of life.
CONCLUSION
Cases in which terminally ill patients request life-sustaining procedures
that their physicians would deny on the grounds of medical futility are
inevitably more challenging for physicians than the more customary end-oflife cases in which the patient refuses such measures. Although these forms
of treatment, by definition, have no curative properties and thus will serve
only to prolong the patient’s dying process, the Act inferentially measures
the physician’s professional obligations solely by the patient’s choice.147 By
defining life-sustaining procedures as the least common denominator of the
patient’s absolute right to refuse treatment and by expressly providing that
the patient’s right is “permissive and voluntary,” the legislature effectively
tied the hands of physicians with respect to these decisions.
This result reflects both the Act’s theoretical grounding in the doctrine
of informed consent and the logical basis for distinguishing between a
physician who accepts a patient’s refusal of treatment and one who
engages in an affirmative act that brings about death. More fundamentally,
it reflects the manner in which the legislature chose to balance the inherent
conflict between the individual’s right of self-determination and the state’s
interest in preserving life.
The law has traditionally recognized that a terminally ill patient does
not act with the intent to die when he refuses treatment that will serve only
to prolong the dying process.148 Rather, the law considers death in such
147. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1151A(1), (3); 1151B(1), (2) (2016).
148. The Glucksberg Court specifically addressed the distinction between the
passive refusal of unwanted medical treatment and the active demand for
assistance in committing suicide by relying on its holding in Quill for the
proposition that “the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite
distinct.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997). In Quill, the
Supreme Court had rejected the view that the two were entitled to be treated the
same because the ultimate result in either case was to hasten the patient’s death.
Rather, the Court found that the distinction between suicide and the refusal of
treatment “comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.”
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997). The Court found the distinction relevant

2017]

SEEKING A DEFINITION OF MEDICAL FUTILITY

799

cases as the natural progression of the underlying injury or disease that
precipitated the need for treatment.149 For that reason, a physician who
withholds or withdraws life-sustaining treatment pursuant to a patient’s
request is not imputed with the intent to cause death.150
However, this rationale breaks down when a physician refuses to satisfy
a patient’s affirmative request for life-sustaining treatment. A physician who
withholds or withdraws treatment under those circumstances could not
logically deny an intent to cause death, without regard either to the
benevolence of his motive or the strength of his conviction that the requested
treatment would be “futile” in the sense that it would not remedy the
underlying condition.
Moreover, the futility argument is subject to a significant impediment in
fact when the case involves a patient who is believed to be permanently
unconscious.151 A physician who denies such patients the same treatment that
he would offer to others who are similarly situated, but not incapacitated,
would find it difficult to sustain an argument that he considered the treatment
to be futile and thus “medically inappropriate” or “medically ineffective” in a
physiological sense.152
from a causation perspective by noting that a patient who refuses life-sustaining
treatment will die from the natural progression of the underlying disease, while a
person who ingests a lethal concoction will die from his body’s reaction to that
substance. Id. In terms of intent, the Court found that a physician who complies
with a patient’s decision to withhold or withdraw treatment does not necessarily
intend the patient’s death. Id. Nor did the Court believe that such an intent could
be inferred from a physician’s affirmative act of providing aggressive palliative
care that unavoidably hastens death. Id. at 802. The Court did, however, ascribe a
different intent to a physician who assists a patient in committing suicide, finding
that they “must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be
made dead.” Id. (citing Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 367
(1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).
149. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724–25; Quill, 521 U.S. at 802, 807–08.
150. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 1, at 12-33.
151. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re
Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992); In re
Wanglie, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 369 (1991); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
152. The state’s interest in preserving life also would directly challenge a
physician’s reliance on the concept of medical futility to justify the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment that either a patient or his surrogate has
requested. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition in
Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill that a state’s interest in preserving
life is not subject to “judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular
individual may enjoy,” and that a state may assert that interest “even for those
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Finally, in light of the significance that would attend a physician’s
unilateral authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, and
considering the Act’s fundamental purpose of furthering the patient’s right
to control decisions related to his or her own health care, it stands to reason
that the legislature would have expressly recognized such authority in the
statute if it had intended to confer it. Instead, the Act expressly provides
that the patient’s right is “permissive and voluntary” 153 and that any
ambiguities in the statute “shall be interpreted to preserve human life.”154
To infer a contrary intent would contradict these express provisions of the
statute.
These arguments suggest that the Act need not and should not be
construed to vest in physicians the sole decision-making authority
concerning the provision of life-sustaining treatment. This interpretation
is not to deny the importance of these decisions to physicians and other
members of the health care team, but to recognize that entrusting these
matters to the sole discretion of the medical profession would merely beg
a question of profound significance to a variety of interested parties. It
would be unrealistic to expect such a deference to adequately address the
interests of the patient, his family, and society in these matters. Just as
physician-assisted death has been recognized as “far too dangerous a right
to be exercised by patients and physicians alone,”155 it would be even more
dangerous to place in a physician’s hand the unilateral authority to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a patient who has
requested it. To do so would effectively condone involuntary euthanasia,
which the statute expressly disavows.156
Although one might be inclined to consider questions of medical
futility as raising merely abstract matters of law, bioethics, and the
professional standard of medical care, at the core of these cases lies a
fundamental question about the value the law ascribes to human beings.
As a matter of law, does an individual possess an inherent and unchanging
value that exists independently of his decisional capacity at any point in
time during life? Or, is one’s worth derived not from his nature as a human
who are near death.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729–30 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 282). Although a state’s advance directive statute might reflect an implicit
waiver of its interest in preserving life to the extent the law expressly
acknowledges an individual’s unqualified right to refuse treatment, reason posits
that the state would have retained its interest with respect to forms of treatment
and circumstances that fall beyond the express scope of the law.
153. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151(B)(1)–(2) (2016).
154. Id. § 40:1151.9(E).
155. Brief for Bioethics Professors, supra note 145, at 29.
156. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(A).
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being, but from the benefit others might find in his continued biological
existence?157 Only under the first of these perspectives would the rule of
law have meaning. The alternative thesis would define “law” as the
tyranny of a majority, relegating to their subjective preference one’s right
to continue his or her physical existence. The rule of law would be
especially precarious in a world so ordered.
Professor Budziszewski has said that to define any animate being or
inanimate thing with reference to its functional capacity would be
“appropriate for things that have no inherent nature, whose identity is
dependent on our purposes and interests—things that do not intrinsically
deserve to be regarded in a certain way, but which may be regarded in any
way which is convenient.”158 C. S. Lewis expressed the same concept in
this manner: “When we understand a thing analytically and then dominate
and use it for our own convenience, we reduce it to the level of ‘Nature’
in the sense that we suspend our judgements [sic] of value about it, ignore
its final cause (if any), and treat it in terms of quantity.” 159 As applied to
human beings, therefore, both Budziszewski and Lewis would reject the
functional, relative view of value. In fact, Lewis went so far as to suggest
that a society deceives itself when it comes to regard man as a mere object
of relative value, or as mere “nature . . . which knows no values as against
that which both has and perceives value,” and that it does so at its peril:
Man’s conquest of Nature turns out, in the moment of its
consummation, to be Nature’s conquest of man. Every victory we
seemed to win has lead us, step by step, to this conclusion. All
Nature’s apparent reverses have been but tactical withdrawals. We
thought we were beating her back when she was luring us on. What
157. By holding that a competent person’s right to refuse medical treatment
survives the loss of capacity, the jurisprudence concerning patient rights at the
end of life has consistently acknowledged that all persons have an inherent value
that exists independently of their decision-making capacity at any point during
their biological existence. It follows that a person’s inherent value derives from
his nature as a human being rather than from his physical or intellectual capacity.
Quill, 521 U.S. at 808–09; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1229 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664. See also Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 732 (stating that the prohibition against assisted suicide “reflects and reinforces
[a state’s] policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must
be no less valued than the lives of the young and healthy”). See also Frederick R.
Parker, Jr., Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill: An Analysis of the
Amicus Curiae Briefs and the Supreme Court’s Majority and Concurring
Opinions, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 469, 526 n.174 (1999).
158. BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 34, at 71–72.
159. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 69 (HarperOne 2001).
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looked to us like hands held up in surrender was really the opening
of arms to enfold us forever. . . . [A]s soon as we . . . reduc[e] our
own species to the level of mere Nature . . . the being who stood to
gain and the being who has been sacrificed is one and the same.160
Although Lewis penned these thoughts more than 60 years ago, their
portent is assuming an increasing reality in the United States as illustrated
by decisions in cases such as Causey161 and related legal arguments that
advance directive statutes should be construed to vest in physicians with
the unilateral authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment
that a patient or his surrogate has requested. These developments suggest
the ironic possibility that one’s right to refuse treatment as set forth in the
Act might be transmuted into an obligation to do so, effectively condoning
involuntary euthanasia, an intent which the statute expressly refutes.162
The manner in which the law responds to these renditions of medical
futility has the potential to influence the future of health care in ways that
cannot completely be foreseen, but that Lewis suggests portend
consequences that society would both regret and find difficult to reverse.
These risks can be avoided if the law remains grounded in the common
thread that underlies the principles enunciated by the courts in In re
Quinlan,163 Cruzan,164 In re Conroy,165 Glucksberg,166 and Quill.167 Each
of these cases reflect the law’s recognition of the inherent value of human
life as reflected in two prisms: first, the enduring right of each individual
either to accept or refuse medical treatment, whether through his own
voice or that of a surrogate, and without regard to his state of decisional or
functional capacity; and second, the corresponding unqualified interest of
the state in the preservation of life, including the lives of the weakest and
most vulnerable among us.
Both the Act and this body of jurisprudence implicitly recognize that
each member of the species homo sapiens is by definition a bearer of rights
and a subject to be held in absolute regard, not because of what he can do,
but because of what he is by nature.168 In this way, the law presupposes
that one’s standing as a person who possesses inherent value is not a
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 68.
Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1151.9(A) (2016).
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
LEE & GEORGE, supra note 22.
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function either of his condition, his stage of development at any point in
time, or the value that others might ascribe to him in light of those
characteristics. In the context of the specific issues addressed in this
Article, it would follow that a permanently unconscious patient would be
subject to the same regard as any other person whose capacity is not
compromised.

